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Unless otherwise indicated, these materials are full translations of articles appearing in People's Republic of China periodicals.

Changing the Title of "Water Margin" and What It Reveals

by

Hsü Chen (徐震)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 9, September 9, 1975)

In the mid-1930's an American woman missionary named Buck translated "Water Margin" into English and changed the title of the book to "All Men Are Brothers." Like some imperialists at the time who claimed they "love China as well as America," she was a China hand born in China and had lived in China for some time. She wrote several novels about life in the Chinese countryside and settled on Sai Chen-chu (賽珍珠) as her name in Chinese. Having translated "Water Margin" this bourgeois writer thought she had assimilated the elixir of that book so she changed its title. Apparently, she was inspired by the phrase "Within the four seas all are brothers."

This way of changing the title of "Water Margin," compared with Chin Sheng-t'an's abridged version of the book and his crude way of bringing forward Ch'i Shu-yeh or persons like him, was slightly superior to Chin's approach because it left no tell-tale traces and could delude and perplex the reader. The book "Water Margin" begins with the sworn brotherhood of Chu Wu and others at Shaohua Mountain and proceeds to the "seating of Liangshanpo heroes" as the narrative unfolds. To the assembling of the 108 men of different backgrounds and diverse experiences the word "brother" indeed serves cohesion purposes well. It is therefore most befitting to title the book "All Men Are Brothers."

Nevertheless in class society no fraternal relations are in fact not stamped with the brand of a class. Chairman Mao has pointed out: "In class society everyone lives as a member of a particular class, and every kind of thinking, without exception, is stamped with the brand of a class." Even blood brothers would fight against each other for power and gain within the ruling class. Innumerable accounts of brothers scheming and fighting against each other are recorded in books of history. In one of his poems "The Highest Building," Hsin Chia-hsüan wrote: "Accommodation among friends is possible in the world but brothers in ancient times found themselves irreconcilable." Is that so? When Yung Cheng of the Ch'ing Dynasty became emperor after a violent struggle, his brothers were either murdered or jailed, with their names even changed into pigs and dogs. If this applies to blood brothers, does it apply more to the so-called "sworn brothers"?

Calling one brother should be subjected to a class analysis. Revolutionary contingents in the past did regard the appelation brother as a concept denoting equality and as a means of forging internal solidarity against acts of rank oppression by the ruling class, as in the case of certain people associated with the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo. But the purpose for which it was intended had never gone beyond this. In other instances which are too numerous to be mentioned here, some people under the guise of

calling others "brothers" have clandestinely betrayed their brothers. Let's take "Water Margin" as an example. Don't be deluded by the semblance of equality in the Chung-i T'ang where the gathering called each other brother and partook of choice food and wine while discussing the sharing of the loot of gold and silver. Actually, under the yellowish banner of "carrying out the wish of Heaven" there were clear distinctions as to rank and position, with schemings and counter schemings, strange bed-fellows indeed. There were not the least traces of "brotherly amity." Take Sung Chiang, who even dreamed of seeking offers of amnesty and enlistment. He had nothing but praise for those top members of the ruling class who surrendered. The moment they were freed, he confided with them about their desire to "identify themselves with the imperial court." Sung Chiang, however, never treated Li K'uei on the basis of equality, though the latter had fought resolutely and bravely and saved his life. Sung just had Li at his beck and call, making him a tragic figure in the relations between the two men. From these two persons we can readily perceive what is called brotherly relations. To rescue Sung in Chiangchou, Li K'uei did not hesitate to go into close combat. Brandishing his big axes, he made a scene at the execution ground at the risk of losing his own life. He was so devoted to his "elder brother Sung Kung-ming" that he would not refuse to go to fire and water and through thick and thin. Speaking of "brotherly affection" and "a sense of righteousness which distinguishes the wandering stalwarts of the time," he had given everything that Sung had asked for. However, when Sung became the top man in Liangshan Mountain, Li K'uei had practically no say in the mountain stronghold, let alone being among the policy-makers. Apart from fighting desperately in combat and being duped from time to time, he would be instantly scolded by Sung whenever he proposed something like "fighting our way to Tungching." In such circumstances he would be threatened with expulsion or even "decapitation" or a "temporary reprieve," until finally he had to place his life at the disposal of his "elder brother" whose life he once saved. Alas! What a tragic end to a hero of the peasant uprising. Why? As far as Li was concerned, he suffered under the delusion of the "brotherly relations" because he failed to discern the true features of a hidden traitor like Sung. Class limitations molded Li's character and turned him into one who was neither sharp-sighted nor clear-headed. In Li's time it would of course be impossible for a Communist like K'o Hsiang of "Azalea Mountain" to show the path of the revolution. This is the limitation of the time. It is also the social root-cause of Li's tragic end. As far as Sung is concerned, he had beside him a man who clamored for "fighting our way to Tungching and seize the damn throne," a man who was of course a thorn in his side, because Li would stand in the way of capitulation and his seeking an offer of amnesty and enlistment. Either the East wind prevails over the West wind or vice versa, there being no room for compromise and reconciliation on the question of line. Despite Li's persistence in calling Sung Chiang "Elder brother Sung Kung-ming," he was doomed as long as he adhered to the line of "opposing the Sung emperor." This is exactly what happened to him.

Li's end exemplifies what would be in store for those would-be rebels in the mountain stronghold who were against the line pursued by Sung, who stopped at nothing in order to bring his men into line. Therefore, behind the deceptively tantalizing veil what are called "brotherly affection"

and "righteousness" are nothing but ruthless class relations. This appears to be quite clear to everybody.

Using the ultra-class concept as a guise to cover up conspiracies and intrigues is itself a means of waging class struggle. Sung was a master of the art. People like Brezhnev in our time are masters, too. On the one hand they give lip service to "fraternal relations" within the socialist big family; on the other, they dish up the "theory of limited sovereignty" and occupy "fraternal countries" with tanks. This is merely a crude adaptation of the same version. China's Chiang Kai-shek was also versed in this old pattern and he climbed up on the bodies of the revolutionary people by relying on the "brotherly relations" of "green and red bands" /secret societies/.

Regardless of Pearl Buck's intent in changing the title of "Water Margin" into "All Men Are Brothers," in an objective sense it could not be anything more than a futile attempt to hoodwink thousands upon thousands of Li K'uei-type people in China so they would be obsessed with the mentality that "within the four seas all men are brothers" and thus fail to see tough and pliant knives that were produced within and outside their camp. But this after all was the subjective wish of the reactionary classes and at that time this trick was already exposed. Not long after the publication of the English translation, the Communist Lu Hsün tersely commented in a letter: ".... But it is incorrect to entitle the book 'All Men Are Brothers' because those in the mountain did not treat everybody as brother." Not treating everybody as brother means regarding him as a member of a particular class. This is a pointed remark that goes right into the heart of the matter. What the changing of the title of "Water Margin" reveals is that we should always analyze things from the angle of classes and class struggle.

The era of "Water Margin" is long over but the "Water Margin"-type justice has still obsessed some people even down to this day. This sense of justice, however, is in the service of the capitulationist line pursued by Sung Chiang, an approach affirmed by "Water Margin." This is particularly worthy of our deep pondering today.

* * *

Comment on "Water Margin's" Capitulationism

by

Chai Ch'ing (翟青)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 9, September 9, 1975)

In the 120-chapter version of "Water Margin," its author arranged for Ch'ao Kai to die of an arrow wound in the middle of the story so that Sung Chiang could become the No. 1 leader at Liangshan Mountain. In "Water Margin," its author made a special plot arrangement to exclude Ch'ao Kai from the 108 people, which nakedly shows the author's reactionary political intention of preaching capitulationism. As Chairman Mao has pointed out, "The merit of the book 'Water Margin' lies precisely in the portrayal of capitulation. It serves as teaching material by negative example to help all people recognize capitulationists."

In "Water Margin," Ch'ao and Sung are not isolated individuals, but persons who respectively represent two categorically opposed political lines. Ch'ao organized and led the collective struggle to seize the birthday gifts for a high-ranking official. After betraying with practical revolutionary action the landlord class to which he originally belonged, Ch'ao plunged into the ranks of the peasant insurgents. Having gone to Liangshan Mountain, he cooperated closely with Wu Yung and the three Juan brothers to wipe out the "attacking and suppressing" government troops, to store grain, to build boats, and to train troops and horses. In the struggle to consolidate and expand the base area for the peasant revolution, he displayed an outstanding capability of leadership, thus winning wholehearted support from the Liangshan peasant insurgent army. Just as Chu Kuei said, "He simply wants to oppose the emperor of the Sung Dynasty." Or as Li K'uei declared, "Let us march on Tungching and take over the damned throne." This shows the determination of the peasantry to be diametrically opposed to the landlord class and expresses the will and aspirations of the revolutionary peasants.

Sung Chiang is different. He is a careerist and conspirator of the landlord class whose mind is full of Confucianist ideology. At first, he regarded Liangshan Mountain as "a place of the disloyal and unfilial." He refused on several occasions to be rescued and brought to Liangshan by the heroes there. However, when he was forced to go to Liangshan Mountain, he changed his tune immediately after he stepped into Chü-i T'ing. He said in a lofty, emotional voice: "I am grateful to you all for rescuing me by risking your own lives." Before Ch'ao, he never openly mentioned "amnesty and enlistment." To Ch'ao, he pretended to "wholeheartedly share weal and woe with the elder brother." In his heart, he obviously held that the rebellion at Liangshan Mountain was a crime which would incur "the death of one's entire family." However, when Li K'uei declared at a celebration banquet held at Liangshan Mountain that "we are rising in rebellion, so what?" Sung remained silent and did very well in pretension. What is more, he carried out a great deal of covert capitulationist activities behind Ch'ao's back. To greet the imperial court's offer of amnesty and enlistment, he painstakingly preached among surrendered generals including

P'eng Chi, Hu Yen-cho, Hsü Ning: "What we are waiting for is pardon by the holy emperor," and "We are simply waiting for the offer of amnesty and enlistment from the imperial court." At the same time, he obsequiously confessed to the Grand General Su, a member of the landlord-class ruling clique: "Sung was originally a petty official in Yünch'eng. I was forced to take to the woods by a prosecution. Using the Liangshan Mountain as a temporary shelter, I am waiting only for the court's offer of amnesty and enlistment." You see, Sung not only cultivated his capitulationist forces within the Liangshan Mountain but boldly and shamelessly collaborated with members of the imperial court in betrayal of the Liang Mountain insurgent army.

Regarding the struggle between the two lines waged by Ch'ao Kai and Sung Chiang in its first 60 chapters, "Water Margin" summarizes as follows: "Ch'ao Kai was ambitious to declare himself emperor, so he died early. It was only Sung Chiang who appealed to the masses to uphold justice; thus he became the leader of the stronghold. Sung Chiang did not want to stay with the rebels in the mountain but intended to throw himself into the arms of the court long ago." This means that Ch'ao, being intent on rebelling, was disloyal and unjust and should die early and that Sung, who "intended to throw himself into the arms of the court long ago," should reasonably "become the leader of the stronghold" so as to freely push a capitulationist line. As Chairman Mao has pointed out, "Sung Chiang pushes capitulationism, practices revisionism, changes Ch'ao's Chü-i T'ing to Chung-i T'ang, and accepts the offer of amnesty and enlistment." The story told in "Water Margin" after its 60th chapter tells of how Sung used the concept of loyalty to the emperor to rule and transform Liangshan and consequently ruined the revolutionary cause there. It is a process in which Sung moved step by step toward the court along the path crimson with the blood of the uprising peasant forces.

The first step: Sung changed Ch'ao's Chü-i T'ing to Chung-i T'ang the first day he came to power (Chapter 60).

The second step: Sung, through his arrangement for "heroes' seating order," put Lu Chün-i and other capitulationists in leading positions and vital departments, and excluded or demoted Li K'uei, Wu Yung, the three Juan brothers and Chu Kuei who upheld Ch'ao's line (Chapter 71).

The third step: Sung at the chrysanthemum banquet openly set forth the capitulationist slogan: "We hope the King of Heaven will send down his decree making an offer of amnesty and enlistment at an early date." (Chapter 71)

The fourth step: Sung personally went to the capital on the evening of the 15th day of the first lunar month to curry favor with Li Shih-shih, the emperor's favorite courtesan and to ask her to get from the emperor an offer of amnesty and enlistment (Chapter 72).

The fifth step: After Sung Hui Tsung's first plot to offer amnesty and enlistment was smashed, Sung personally accompanied the Grand General Ch'en to the foot of the mountain and begged him to say something nice about him before the emperor (Chapter 75).

The sixth step: After the court's two unsuccessful attempts to offer amnesty and enlistment, Sung felt "ever more guilty." After he defeated Tung Kuan, he did not chase him and his troops; after taking Kao Ch'iu alive, he set him free. In addition, he expressed to them his intention of submitting himself to the court (Chapter 80).

The seventh step: Sung Chiang once again sent Yen Ch'ing and Tai Tsung to the capital to bribe Li Shih-shih and the Grand General Su in hopes of getting an offer of amnesty and enlistment from the emperor for the Liangshan people.

The eighth step: After his surrender, Sung set out to fight Fang La -- a brigand who did not "carry out Heaven's wish."

The ninth step: When Sung was about to die after drinking poisoned wine offered by the court, he cheated Li K'uei into drinking the same wine, and shouted: "I would rather the court fail me than I fail the court."

These are the clear footprints the renegade Sung Chiang left after taking over the leadership of the Liangshan stronghold. This is the way he acted till he walked into his tomb. On his deathbed he confessed: "All my life I have advocated 'loyalty and justice.' I have always acted upon my conscience." "Acting upon his conscience" is false, but "advocating 'loyalty and justice'" is true. From being "a filial and righteous black third brother" in Yünch'eng county to being the leader at Chung-i T'ang "carrying out Heaven's wish" and then to being the governor of Ch'u-chow loyally serving the feudal court, Sung's entire life was involved in counterrevolutionary activities around "loyalty and justice." Loyal to the feudal ruling class, Sung could never be faithful to the Liangshan Mountain revolutionary cause. A revolutionary opportunist practicing revisionism was bound to become a capitulationist betraying the revolution and serving as a running dog of the reactionaries. This is a special characteristic of all revisionists. Did Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, who pushed a revisionist line, promote class capitulationism at home and national capitulationism abroad?

The capitulationist line advocated by Sung had a deep class basis in feudal society. When the storm of peasant revolution was blowing across the land, people of all types were swept into the revolutionary current, many of whom were defectors from the feudal ruling camp. These people were vacillating in the whirlpool of peasant revolution. Some changed their stand after transforming themselves and firmly took the road of peasant revolution, while others continued to stick to the reactionary stand and finally returned to the opposite side of the peasant revolution from where they came. People of the latter category formed the class basis for Sung Chiang to push a capitulationist line at Liangshan, people who could further be divided into the following groups: one group consisted of generals who were despatched by the Sung court to suppress the peasant uprisings and who surrendered after they were captured by the Liangshan Mountain heroes, such as Kuan Sheng, Ch'in Ming, Hu Yen-cho and Tung P'ing. Another group consisted of important figures of the landlord class who were enticed to the Liangshan Mountain by Sung Chiang, such as Lu Chün-i and Li Ying. A third group was

composed of persons who were defeated in the internal struggle within the landlord class and who went to the mountain to seek a way out, such as Ch'ai Chin, Tai Tsung and Yang Chih. Since these people were unwilling to change their reactionary stand, they naturally formed a faction supporting Sung Chiang in his effort to push a capitulationist line. For instance, Ch'ai Chin, Tai Tsung and others risked their lives in going to the capital to bribe officials for the purpose of obtaining an imperial offer of amnesty and enlistment. For another instance, Lu Chün-i not only went along with Sung Chiang in collaborating with the court in order to obtain an imperial offer of amnesty and enlistment but was as ruthless as Sung in quelling the peasant uprising after accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment. Finally, when Sung Chiang's line increasingly lost support and even Yen Ch'ing wanted to leave Liangshan Mountain to live in seclusion, Lu Chün-i dressed Yen down, saying: "When we are about to return home in glory and all our family members will be benefited, why do you want to do such a meaningless thing?" It was these people on whom Sung relied in practicing capitulationism, and they supported him also because his line represented their common class interests.

Where there are capitulationists, there are people who oppose capitulation. Many heroes at Liangshan were unwilling to surrender. People like Li K'uei and Juan the Second, the Fifth and the Seventh were resolute anti-capitulationists. Coming from poor families, they suffered a great deal from political suppression and economic exploitation by the landlord class. They pinned the lofty hope of "bringing happiness to the ordinary people" on the cause of the Liangshan Mountain rebellion, and deeply resented the capitulationist line that ruined the future of the revolution. The moment Sung put forward at the chrysanthemum banquet the capitulationist slogan "we hope the King of Heaven will send down his decree making an early offer of amnesty and enlistment," Li K'uei angrily cursed: "Damn amnesty and enlistment!" He then kicked a table and broke it into pieces. When the Sung court sent Grand General Ch'en to Liangshan Mountain to offer amnesty and enlistment, Li K'uei seized the imperial decree and tore it into pieces. He got hold of Ch'en and beat him up. Even after the offer of amnesty and enlistment was accepted, Li K'uei shouted on several occasions: "Let us rebel!" "Let us go back to Liangshan Mountain!" No wonder that Sung regarded Li as "one who is still intent on rebellion." Let's look at the three Juan brothers. They "fear neither heaven nor the earth, nor government officials." They showed great contempt for Grand General Ch'en when he came to Liangshan to offer amnesty and enlistment. They drilled a hole in the boat carrying Ch'en, causing this "angel" considerable embarrassment. They also opened the bottles of imperial wine, emptied them with members of the waterborne force and filled them with wine brewed in a local village. They did not give a damn to the emperor. When Sung Chiang suppressed Wang Ch'ing and went back to the capital with his troops, the three Juan brothers, hating his capitulationist line more and more, discussed with Li Chün, Chang Heng, Chang Shun and others the possibility of making Wu Yung their leader. They went to Wu Yung and said to him: "Now we ask you, as military adviser, to make a decision. If we talk to the elder brother /Sung/, he will surely object. It is our intention to fight our way from here and loot the Tungching before returning to Liangshan Mountain. It is better to be brigands." Li K'uei

and the three Juan brothers represented the true colors of the Liangshan heroes. They failed because the leader of this peasant insurgent army was bad and surrendered.

Wu Yung, an intellectual, had followed Ch'ao Kai in rebellion for many years. The practice in struggle for many years cultivated profound feelings in him for Ch'ao's line. He saw more clearly the steps taken by Sung to change Ch'ao's line, and it was he who repeatedly dealt with emergency situations skilfully and foiled Sung's plots. When Sung colluded with big landlord Lu Chün-i in practicing revisionism at Liangshan Mountain, Wu became alert. As soon as Lu arrived in Liangshan Mountain, Sung hurriedly wanted to offer him the No. 1 chair. Li K'uei opposed this and Wu Sung was unhappy. The atmosphere was tense. It was Wu Yung who suggested: "Let Master Lu take a rest in the eastern chamber as a guest of honor. When he renders meritorious services later, we will discuss the matter of giving him leadership." Thus they poured a bucket of cold water over Lu's head. (Chapter 67)

When Lu Chün-i captured Shih Wen-kung alive, Sung again urged everyone to let Lu be the stronghold leader. Wu Yung was the first to express his opinion. He said: "Brother Sung, you are the chief in command, and Master Lu the second. The rest of us will remain in their old posts." However, Sung still refused to give up. He persistently stuck to his gun under the pretext that he just wanted to execute Ch'ao Kai's will. When Sung was offering the leadership with Lu declining the offer, Wu Yung, on the one hand, said: "If you, elder brother, do not want to keep the position, you'll only let us all down." On the other hand, he signaled the others with his eyes. At this moment, Li K'uei, Wu Sung, Liu T'ang and Lu Chih-shen all rose to make a scene, and Lu was unable to usurp the supreme power. (Chapter 68) When, later, Sung Chiang wanted to kill Li K'uei at the chrysanthemum banquet, Wu Yung defended Li K'uei, saying that Li "was drunk." Before and after Grand General Ch'en came to offer amnesty and enlistment, Wu Yung more than once proposed to deal with the court by force. He said: "Let's fight them hard so they will become frightened even in their dreams." When the Sung court tried to offer amnesty and enlistment for a second time, it was Wu Yung who made Hua Jung kill the emissary with an arrow as the latter was reading an imperial decree. This foiled Sung's plot to surrender. However, since Wu Yung's class origin and political and economic position differed from those of Li K'uei and the three Juan brothers, his rebellious spirit was not as high as theirs. Particularly when he saw that Sung's capitulationist line was gradually gaining ground, he became somewhat disheartened and had the thought of leading a secluded life "in the manner of T'ao Yüan-ming."

Lin Ch'ung, Lu Chih-shen and Wu Sung, who came over from the enemy camp, belonged to a different type. Although they had different experiences and different reasons for joining the insurgent army, they received a definite measure of tempering in the revolutionary furnace at Liangshan and took the revolutionary, rebellious path with great resolve. At the beginning, Lin Ch'ung accepted Kao Ch'iu's persecution philosophically. However, lessons of blood gradually awakened him, and made him head for Liangshan. After he arrived there, he clashed with White Clothes Scholar Wang Lun, who forbade others to make revolution, and faithfully

followed Ch'ao Kai's line. Not long after Ch'ao's death, during a campaign to attack Peiching city, the reactionary army officer Kuan Sheng fought back arrogantly, yet Sung applauded him. At this moment Lin Ch'ung declared indignantly: "Since we brothers came to Liangshan, we have fought scores of battles. We have never been daunted. Why should we become daunted now?" When Lin dashed forward to fight Kuan Sheng, Sung issued an order to retreat. Lin protested: "We are about to take this man. Why do you, elder brother, want retreat?" It can be seen that he was angry at Sung's obsequious attitude toward the feudal rulers.

Li Chih-shen and Wu Sung not only opposed Sung's disgraceful act of offering Li Chün-i the top leadership but also boldly stepped forward to take the side of Li K'uei in two struggles -- one at the chrysanthemum banquet and the other at the meeting with Grand General Ch'en who came with the imperial offer of amnesty and enlistment. The fact that Lin Ch'ung, Wu Sung and Lu Chih-shen upheld rebellion and opposed capitulation fully indicated the unpopularity of Sung's line and also showed that the revolutionary furnace can temper and remold people.

Although Li K'uei, Wu Yung and the three Juan brothers waged a long struggle against Sung's line, their efforts still ended in failure. As for Sung's capitulationist line pledging loyalty to the emperor, they saw more of the line in appearance and in perception, but they failed to understand its essence. This was mainly because they were blindfolded by the word "justice." In the Ch'ao Kai period, "justice" in Liangshan originally meant to "kill all evil-doers" and to "wipe out all unjust things." Once, it was a spirit linking all the rebels from all corners of the country. But, it itself contained dregs of exploiting-class ideas, and could not truly become the ideological weapon in the peasant revolution. On the contrary, it could be easily utilized by capitulationists hidden in the revolutionary camp. The moment Sung arrived in Liangshan, he vigorously babbled about loyalty and justice, saying that it was necessary to "uphold loyalty and justice" and "achieve both loyalty and justice." However, the Liangshan heroes did not pay enough attention to his words nor raise their vigilance in time. Sung was thus able to change Chü-i T'ing to Chung-i T'ang as well as tampering with and revising Ch'ao's revolutionary line. This change in wording signified the beginning of Sung's efforts to transform the ranks of the Liangshan peasant insurgents in accordance with the "loyal to the emperor" idea. "Loyalty" was placed before "justice," and "justice" became a tool for "pledging loyalty to the emperor." However, the Liangshan heroes did not realize this.

Exactly as was expected, Sung used "justice" which was subordinate to "loyalty" to gravely erode and poison the ranks of uprising peasants at the Liangshan Mountain. Like anesthetic, "justice" benumbed many renowned heroes. Armed with two huge axes, Li K'uei was a hero difficult to outperform on the battlefield. But, as he blindly followed justice, he awoke and slumbered alternately in face of the acute struggle between the two lines, and failed to see through Sung's true features as a renegade and spy. At the fore-mentioned chrysanthemum banquet, when Sung issued an order to kill him, Li K'uei, out of everyone's expectation, said: "I don't blame you brother if you kill me. I won't hate you if you cut me to pieces."

Even at the end of the book when Sung poisoned him to death with wine, Li K'uei still said tearfully: "All right, all right, all right. I serve you brother when I am alive. After I die, I will still be your little ghost." Li K'uei's death from a cup of "justice" wine, and his having no regret, is both pitiable and sad. What an historical lesson that deserves to be remembered!

Wu Yung also suffered blindly following justice. Even when Sung fully exposed his capitulationist features, he still did not want to break with Sung. On their way back to the capital after an expedition against Wang Ch'ing, the three Juan brothers and others resolved to leave Sung, and urged Wu to lead them back to Liangshan. Wu Yung was moved, yet he attached greater importance to men than to the line, and said to the Juan brothers: "Since ancient times, a snake cannot worm its way forward without a head. How dare I make a decision alone." Although he tried to persuade Sung to return to Liangshan saying that "the brothers are complaining," yet when Sung threatened him by saying "in that case, chop off my head" and "I'll commit suide," he dared to say no more. After Sung died, Wu hanged himself on a tree in front of Sung's grave in hopes of "meeting my brother in the nether world." Both Li K'uei and Wu Yung died for the word "justice." This historical tragedy eloquently shows the reactionary nature of "justice."

Did Sung not call himself "justice advocator" and regarded himself as "justice upholder"? What kind of "justice" did he advocate? Did he uphold justice for the rebellion cause? No. He was a justice advocator not for the peasant revolution but for the landlord class. Why did he want to uphold "justice"? He did so to pledge loyalty to the emperor. His open advocacy of loyalty to the emperor had little market at Liangshan Mountain. After suffering so much from oppression and exploitation by feudal rule, how could uprising peasants be loyal to the chieftain of the landlord class? Yet, making use of justice, he was able quite easily to entice people to be loyal to the emperor for his sake. Like a rope, "justice" tightly bound the Liangshan heroes like "beads or bamboo rafts." To uphold justice, they lived and died together, following Sung who was loyal to the emperor. In the name of upholding justice, they could only in the end "uphold" the capitulationist line of being loyal to the emperor.

The word loyalty changed the revolutionary nature of the peasant insurgent army. The word justice shackled the hands, feet and souls of the uprising peasants like handcuffs and fetters. It made them fall from the top of the Liangshan Mountain to the foot of the walls of the imperial city and become prisoners of "loyalty" and "justice." In the final chapter of "Water Margin," the author concocted a story about Sung Hui Tsung touring the Liangshan Mountain in a dream, making Sung the "all mighty marquis of loyalty and justice," and building for him a "grand temple of loyalty." The author claimed that the people worshipped Sung "in hopes of getting winds and rains." You see, all -- from the Son of Heaven to the common people including the author of "Water Margin" -- went out of their way to praise Sung, who became the ideal personification of "loyalty and justice forming the basis of establishing oneself in life." This description in "Water Margin" is apparently aimed at encouraging people, like Sung, to "achieve loyalty and justice." But it actually helps the proletariat and

the revolutionary people understand by negative example that to pledge "loyalty" to reactionary rulers, to uphold "justice" for friendship with the capitulationists, and to judge a person without taking into consideration his class origin and the line will surely lead the revolution to defeat.

Throughout "Water Margin" praises capitulationists, peddles the capitulationist line, and promotes capitulationist theories. But, this is also its merit, for it can serve as teaching material by negative example helping all people know who the capitulationists are.

In the early stage after the founding of the People's Republic, Chairman Mao, in view of the praise lavished on "The Story of Wu Hsün" and Wu Hsün by the ideological and cultural circles at that time, pointed out: People like Wu Hsün "do everything to fawn upon reactionary feudal rulers. Ought we to praise such ugly acts?" Chairman Mao also pointed out: "In the view of many writers, history has developed not by the replacement of the old by the new, but by the exertion of every effort to preserve the old from extinction, not by class struggle to overthrow the reactionary feudal rulers who had to be overthrown, but by the negation of the class struggle of the oppressed and their submission to these rulers, in the manner of Wu Hsün." In 1954, Chairman Mao again pointed out in his "Letter Concerning Studies of the 'Dream of the Red Chamber'": "The film 'Inside Story of the Ch'ing Court' which has been described by certain people as patriotic but is in fact a film of national betrayal, has not been criticized and repudiated at any time since it was shown all over the country. Although 'The Story of Wu Hsün' has been criticized, up to now no lessons have been drawn." These most profound teachings of Chairman Mao's are of great significance in guiding us to discuss and criticize "Water Margin" today and to eradicate the pernicious influence of the theory of class harmony contained in the studies of "Water Margin." Like the "Inside Story of the Ch'ing Court" and "The Story of Wu Hsün," "Water Margin" is a teaching material by negative example peddling capitulationism. Just as we can never tolerate the praise lavished on the slave Wu Hsün, so we can never tolerate any praise lavished on the renegade Sung Chiang. From the ancient capitulationist Sung Chiang, we can see the ugly features of the modern capitulationists, Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao. We must fully develop our criticism of this book "Water Margin," bring its role as teaching material by negative example into full play, clearly oppose the slavish mentality, capitulationism and revisionism, and carry the struggle to combat and prevent revisionism through to the end.

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Comment on "Oppose Only Corrupt Officials, But Not the Emperor"

by

Wei Yung-cheng (魏永征)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 9, September 9, 1975)

"Water Margin" advocates throughout "opposing only corrupt officials, but not the emperor." What kind of idea is this? Many people say it reflects the "limitations of the peasantry," a "typical" "peasant revolutionary thought."

Is that really so? Highly doubtful. Let us first discuss "Water Margin" for its own sake. Apart from writing mainly about the Liangshan Mountain insurgent army, the book also touches on other insurgent armies under T'ien Hu, Wang Ch'ing and Fang La. In these camps, no apricot yellow banner of "carry out Heaven's wish" was hoisted, but there were calls for "changing the dynasty" and an open opposition against the Sung Son of Heaven. Even among the 108 people at Liangshan, there were people ready to oppose the emperor. Chu Kuei, nicknamed Speedy Courier and a veteran leader of the insurgent army, declared long ago: "We're sworn enemies of the great Sung emperor." This obviously was not his own personal declaration but clearly a political declaration of the peasant insurgent army led by Ch'ao Kai at that time. Then there was the Black Whirlwind Li K'uei, who yelled again and again, "Let's charge toward Tungching and seize the damn throne." The spearhead of struggle was directed at none other than the emperor himself.

So the problem arises. If "opposing only corrupt officials, but not the emperor" is a "typical" "peasant revolutionary thought," then which is the class whose thinking is represented by the anti-emperor declarations of Ch'ao Kai, Chu Kuei, Li K'uei, T'ien Hu, Wang Ch'ing and Fang La? If "opposing only corrupt officials, but not the emperor" is a manifestation of the "limitations of the peasantry," then what kind of spell drives this group of people to overstep these "limitations"?

If we look at the whole of the history of peasant revolutions in China, we will face even more problems. "The Blue Heaven is gone, the Yellow Heaven is established" is meant to oppose the "Heaven" of the Eastern Han Dynasty; "the heaven-storming fragrance permeates Changan, everywhere in the city people are in golden armor" is meant to storm the "Heaven" of the T'ang Dynasty; the insurgent army of Li Tzu-ch'eng that appeared after the completion of "Water Margin" charged toward the Capital and destroyed it, causing Emperor Ch'ung Chen to hang himself at Meishan. "For several thousand years, weren't the palaces of the feudal emperors solid? Yet they crumbled one by one when the masses rose up to rebel." Did they really "limit" their struggles to the confines of "opposing only corrupt officials, but not the emperor"? Historical facts have shown that "opposing only corrupt officials, but

not the emperor" is definitely not a "typical" "revolutionary thought of the peasantry." On the contrary, it was Li K'uei's call to "charge toward Tungching and seize the damn throne" that typically reflected the revolutionary character of the insurgent peasants. What did they want to "seize the damn throne" for? Said Li K'uei, "Brother Ch'ao Kai is going to be the big emperor, and brother Sung Chiang the small emperor." The peasants wanted to take over the throne, and such "peasant emperors" appeared again and again in the several hundred peasant uprisings, large and small, in history. This historical phenomenon itself is of a dual nature: On the one hand, it showed that under the circumstances where "there were as yet no new productive forces, no new relations of production, no new class forces or advanced political parties," it was impossible for peasants to really find the limitations in the path leading to their thorough emancipation. On the other hand, it also strongly manifested the revolutionary character of peasants who were irreconcilably opposed to the feudal kings and emperors and to feudal rule as a whole. The contradiction between the peasantry and the landlord class was the principal contradiction in feudal society. The struggle between the peasants and the landlords was a struggle waged by one class against another, not a struggle merely against a certain individual or group. If they opposed the landlord class but not its chief commander and representative -- the emperor, wouldn't the contradiction between the peasantry and the landlord class be nothing but an empty phrase?

With loyalty to the emperor as the precondition, raising the slogan "oppose corrupt officials" and "evil ministers" was something permitted even within the reactionary landlord class camp. If this were described as a "typical" "peasant revolutionary thought," then Hai Jui, "Pao Lung-t'u," "P'eng Kung" and "Shih Kung" and heroes in many other novels about judges of law might all be described as typical peasant revolutionary heroes. Where did all these concepts such as "corrupt," "honest," "treachery" and "loyalty" come from? They were but products of the struggle among various factions within the landlord class, which is characterized by internal contention and deception. Anyone who wants to beat his opponents and to curry favor with the emperor may accuse them of being "corrupt" and "treacherous." Let us use an example from "Water Margin." On the question of how to cope with the Liangshan insurgent army, the supreme ruling group of the Sung Dynasty was split into two factions: one group consisted of Su Yüan-ching, Chang Shu-yeh and others, who favored "offering amnesty and enlistment"; the other group was composed by people like Kao Ch'iu and T'ung Kuan, who favored "punitive military action." "Two factions start a counterrevolutionary race, with each saying its methods are better than those of the other." "Water Margin" stands on the side of those favoring "amnesty and enlistment," so it accuses those favoring "punitive expeditions" of being "evil ministers." In fact, everyone knows that these two factions had no differences whatsoever as regards the extermination of peasant uprisings; they argued only about the methods for achieving this end. Opposing Kao and T'ung was actually opposing one kind of method, and was a view put forward by Su and Chang. In the eyes of the insurgent peasants, Kao, T'ung, Su and Chang were all "evil" and "corrupt." How can the ideological slogans

raised by the various warring factions within the landlord class be passed off for those of the peasant revolution?

Since "opposing only corrupt officials, but not the emperor" was an ideological slogan of the landlord class, once the representatives of the landlord class introduced it into the peasant insurgent army, it would naturally be transformed into a capitulationist slogan. Please note, after Sung Chiang went to Liangshan, he gradually replaced Ch'ao Kai's revolutionary line of "challenging the great Sung emperor" with the slogan "oppose only corrupt officials, but not the emperor." He changed Chü-i T'ing to Chung-i T'ang. The word "Chung" was highly indicative. Loyalty to whom? To the emperor, to the whole of the feudal ruling class. Why promote "Chung"? Explained Sung, "Our emperor is sacred and wise. He is only blocked by evil ministers. Someday he'll see the light.... What's wrong with taking the offer of amnesty and enlistment so we may unite to save the country and leave our names in history?" After this description, "Water Margin" particularly stresses: after hearing Sung Chiang say this, "everybody expresses gratitude to him." Here the author, on behalf of the landlord class, thanks Sung for convincing and deceiving a group of peasant insurgents, that their sufferings were only caused by "corrupt officials" and "evil ministers," and definitely not by the "sacred, wise Son of Heaven." With attention thus diverted from the struggle, the goal of the struggle also changed. The peasant insurgent army became an army which opposed "corrupt officials" so that the Son of Heaven might one day see the light after the "floating clouds" were dispelled. Here, "opposing only corrupt officials, but not the emperor," in essence, became "opposing corrupt officials for the sake of the emperor." Accepting this slogan, the revolutionary forces who used to challenge the emperor actually laid down their arms and surrendered to the emperor.

As a matter of fact, the essence of "opposing only corrupt officials, but not the emperor" lies in the latter half of the slogan. It is the latter part of the slogan that counts. Since there is basically no principled distinction between "corrupt officials" and "honest officials," it is hard to determine whom to oppose, whom to win over or collaborate with. Sung's "opposing corrupt officials" was meant to please the "brothers." Throughout his "revolutionary" life, Sung killed only one "official" -- Wang Wen-ping. Wang was killed not because he had done many misdeeds but merely because he very nearly cost Sung's life. Sung's attitude toward other civil and military officials, big and small, was an incredibly obsequious one. Just take Kao Ch'iu, a man bitterly hated by the Liangshan insurgent army. After he was captured and brought to Chung-i T'ang, Sung treated him practically as if he were his father, "personally untied" him and "knocked his head on the ground" before him. At this particular moment, Kao Ch'iu was a "man of great integrity" in Sung's eyes. A man who was a "corrupt official" and "evil minister" yesterday was now an "honest official" and a "loyal minister," because he was a man who could benefit Sung. This is after all a common sight of the officialdom within the reactionary ruling class. If Kao Ch'iu could

be treated like that, was there any other "corrupt official" that should be opposed? It is a pity that a magnificent peasant insurgent army should have been led by Sung into such a blind alley: from "opposing only corrupt officials, but not the emperor" to "opposing neither corrupt officials nor the emperor," and finally there was nothing to oppose!

Did they really have nothing to oppose? Not at all. Since the feudal landlord class was a deadly enemy of the peasant class, "not going against the emperor" would inevitably mean going against the peasants and the peasant insurgent army. This is the historical law of class struggle. Just when the Liangshan insurgent army was so confused by Sung that it no longer knew what to oppose, Sung brought into the insurgent ranks a group of reactionary officials who arrived arrogantly to "exterminate" the insurgent army. A few hours after they were captured by the peasant insurgent army, these foes on the battlefields became "brothers" to "live and die together" at Chung-i T'ang, and all because of what Sung said. Curious as it may seem, the truth is that Sung explained to them that he was "not against the emperor." "How dare my humble self turn my back against the court?" "I'm only waiting for the offer of amnesty and enlistment from the court." "I'll then repay my country with my loyalty." .... At hearing this, these defeated generals stopped their panting as they finally came to realize that it was not they who were asked to surrender but it was Sung who was surrendering to them, that they were invited to take over the leadership of the peasant insurgent army rather than join it, and that what they could not get from the battlefield was being presented to them on a silver plate, something even the diehards of the landlord class would accept heartily. So, people like Hu Yen-cho, P'eng Chi, Han Tao and Kuan Sheng wormed their way into the ranks of the peasant insurgent army one after another and usurped the powers of leadership, with the result that the Liangshan leading group was "more than half made up of military officers of the imperial court." By this time, even without the rituals of amnesty and enlistment later on, the insurgent army was essentially "reorganized" into a palatial army of the feudal court. Sung and people like him thus quietly destroyed the Liangshan insurgent army for the emperor. After accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment, it was only natural that this degenerated force should have set out to fight Fang La. Fang La fought against the emperor, and if you didn't go to attack him, wouldn't you also oppose the emperor? What is more, among the generals there were old hands at "suppressing" the insurgent forces. When the slogan "oppose only corrupt officials, but not the emperor" was turned into "oppose only peasants, but not the emperor," all the purposes were achieved!

This is not a change of several slogans, but an inevitable course of a slogan gradually revealing its substance. To get a clearer picture of this process, we need only to look at another reactionary novel, "Tang K'ou Chih." The author Yü Wan-ch'un, a butcher who personally suppressed the uprisings by national minorities, devised a plot where all the 108 people of Liangshan perished. But in this book Ch'en Hsi-chen, the top "meritorious minister" in exterminating the Liangshan peasant revolution, in fact also owed his rise to the

slogan "oppose only corrupt officials, but not the emperor." Persecuted by "evil ministers" and "corrupt officials," he too was forced to "become a bandit" and fought against "evil ministers" and "corrupt officials" even harder than Sung Chiang in "Water Margin." Later, he accepted amnesty and enlistment, stormed Liangshan, and captured Sung Chiang alive, while "evil ministers" Kao Ch'iu, T'ung Kuan and others also perished one after the other. It has been said that "Tang K'ou Chih" is the opposite of "Water Margin," but if one thinks about it, one finds little difference between the two. The only difference is in names: Sung Chiang in "Water Margin" is called Ch'en Hsi-chen in "Tang K'ou Chih," and Fang La is known as "Sung Chiang" in the latter book. If "opposing only corrupt officials, but not the emperor" is really a "typical" "peasant revolutionary thought," shouldn't Ch'en Hsi-chen also be worshipped as a peasant revolution hero?

Sung Chiang in "Water Margin" says in his poem, "Dare I to laugh at Huang Ch'ao for not being a big man." Why did he "laugh" at Huang? Probably because Huang did not know how to "oppose only corrupt officials, but not the emperor" and consequently did not know how to "oppose only peasants, but not the emperor" in order to win his merit and fame at the cost of the blood and lives of the peasant insurgent army. But, let him laugh, his reactionary landlord class logic of undermining the peasant revolution would never be accepted by Huang Ch'ao and other leaders of the peasant revolution. Even in "Water Margin," Sung met with repeated opposition and struggle from Li K'uei, Wu Yung, the three Juan brothers and other anti-capitulationists when the offer of amnesty and enlistment was being considered, and again met with strong disapproval from the insurgents when he decided to set off to "fight" T'ien Hu, Wang Ching and Fang La after accepting amnesty. This from one aspect proves that at that time there were many other peasant leaders who, like Huang Ch'ao, would die in persistent struggle rather than live in subservience and subjugation. Their heroic acts not only thoroughly criticized Sung's reactionary logic but also completely shattered the false theory which described "opposing only corrupt officials, but not the emperor" as a manifestation of the "limitations of the peasantry."

To praise Sung's act of "opposing only corrupt officials, but not the emperor" is actually to ridicule and downgrade the countless peasant revolutionaries who "dare to unhorse the emperor" in Chinese history. Can we tolerate this? The great Lu Hsün stands against it. In clearcut terms, he indignantly and scornfully called Sung Chiang and the like who "set out to fight other brigands for the state -- brigands who did not 'carry out Heaven's wish'" as "lackeys." But who were the real heroes standing opposite to those "lackeys"? Needless to say, it is those "brigands who did not "carry out Heaven's wish" -- those fine sons and daughters of the peasant class who refused to submit and fought to the death with the landlord class with the emperor as its chieftain. It was they, and they alone, who pushed the wheel of history forward.

All revisionist views that defend capitulationist theories such as "opposing only corrupt officials, but not the emperor" should

be criticized and weeded out long ago. In this Lu Hsün set us an example several decades before. It is only in this way that in the course of criticizing ancient capitulationists we can see the ugly and sinister features of modern capitulationists, eradicate the pernicious influence of the revisionist lines of Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao and their like in pursuing class capitulationism at home and national capitulationism abroad, and thus further carry the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat through to the end.

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Young Workers on "Water Margin"

- Minutes of a forum held on August 20

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 9, September 9, 1975)

Hsü Wen-pao (Shanghai Paper-Making Machinery Plant):

The focus of "Water Margin" which preaches capitulationism and gives expression to this in various aspects is that the book is against corrupt officials and not the emperor.

This is quite apparent when one turns the pages of "Water Margin" at random. In Chapter 58, for instance, Sung Chiang immediately unties Hu Yen-cho after the latter is captured for leading an expedition against the insurgent force. He then personally escorts his captive to the inner chamber for a courteous meeting. This surprises even Hu, who asks for the reason. Apologetically, Sung says in reply: "My humble self dares not turn against the throne. Since I have committed a serious crime under duress and through officials' abuse of authority, as a matter of expediency I have come to this body of water for temporary refuge and in anticipation of royal amnesty and enlistment." Therefore, he looks upon the capture of court officials as an opportunity to pledge his loyalty to the throne and regards the officials as "couriers." While his submissive solicitations of army officers and courtiers alike may appear perplexing, each time he is actually submitting himself to the emperor.

On numerous occasions in his lifetime Sung Chiang has lied and acted deceptively but he does reveal his "heartfelt sincerity" and expresses what he has in mind when he meets court officials. When he says he seeks temporary shelter in the body of water he is telling the truth. His participation in the peasant army is in fact for purposes of expediency. This is borne out by the fact that he is constantly obsessed with surrender so he can avail himself of the opportunity to form a special palatial force for the throne and use the peasant revolution to strangle the peasant revolution.

Sung Chiang's meeting with Hu Yen-cho is marked by the former's submission and servility. Yet he acts in the same way when he meets officials whom he calls "corrupt." In the battlefield he sets T'ung Kuan free. On capturing Kao Ch'iu, Liangshan's sworn enemy, he falls on his knees -- kowtowing and mumbling something like acknowledging his unpardonable guilt and "Your Lordship's mercy and pity will always be taken to heart and repaid with death." This is his attitude toward so-called "corrupt" officials, illustrating that he not only is not against the emperor but, in essence, is not against corrupt officials. The emperor and "corrupt officials" belong to the same class camp, with contradictions between them sometimes coming to the fore but falling in after giving consideration to their basic interests. Sung Chiang is only against "corrupt officials" and not the emperor but this inconsistency indicates that he will never absolutely commit himself to doing so radically and in a thoroughgoing way. On the wall of

the Hsunyang Inn he wrote this editious verse: "But soon the tide will turn; I'll have revenge, and stain this spot with enemies' blood galore." At first glance, he appears ready to kill a large number of "corrupt officials." Instead, he goes to fight against the insurgent army of Fang La for the emperor, staining the Hsin-an River, the Ch'ient'ang River and the Yangtze River with blood galore! Therefore, Sung's "seditious poem" is neither a declaration against the emperor and the imperial court nor one against the "corrupt officials." It is merely a forerunner of his brutal suppression of the peasant revolution.

Wang Chiang (Shanghai No. 1 Iron and Steel Mill):

I accept this view. Sung once condemned Kao Ch'iu but after the latter's capture Sung asks for Kao's pardon. This illustrates that the basic interests of the two are identical. Sung is nothing more than a Kao Ch'iu that sneaked into the revolutionary ranks! It is true that many generals of the Liangshan insurgent army turn to the mountain stronghold after they have been persecuted by Kao Ch'iu. But doesn't Sung later also go to slaughter other insurgent forces? Besides, he often resorts to "decapitation so the fallen heads may be displayed for the public" and other means such as "slashing the abdomens to take out the hearts" and this shows that Sung is no less ruthless than Kao Ch'iu!

Some people who disagree with this view say that Sung is finally poisoned to death by Kao Ch'iu. This shows that there are basic contradictions between the two men. We say that the dog-bites-dog contradiction that exists within the landlord class sometimes also becomes irreconcilable. Without trying to recall things which happened a long time ago, let's take the battle royal that took place before liberation between rival warlords within the ranks of the Kuomintang reactionaries. Didn't the hostile factions then resort to machineguns and cannon in their fierce clashes? However, despite the ferocity of their fratricidal strife, the moment the people rose in revolution their common class interests prompted them to form an alliance to brutally put down the people's revolution. It is not surprising at all for Kao Ch'iu to poison Sung. "When the crafty rabbits are dead, the hounds are then cooked for food." In the struggle for power and personal gain within the reactionary camp, it is commonplace to liquidate lackeys that are devoted to their reactionary masters.

Wang Ping-ying (Shanghai No. 5 Iron and Steel Mill):

Right! The contradiction between Sung and Kao is one between two factions within the landlord class. This, however, calls for some explanation. In terms of putting down the peasant uprisings, Sung is far more insidious and ruthless than Kao and in this sense the former is likewise more reactionary.

Let me cite an example at random. Kao Ch'iu and others, for instance, are helpless in dealing with Ch'ao Kai. On many occasions

Ch'ao leads the insurgent army to wipe out the government troops dispatched to "suppress" Liangshan, in addition to raiding the execution ground in Chiangchou, assembling on the Three Hills for justice to attack Ch'ingchou and as far as Tsengtou city. With the revolutionary bases growing in strength and becoming more consolidated, what can Kao Ch'iu and others do except stare at the mountain stronghold with despair. But the moment Sung comes to Liangshan things begin to change. Scheming for power all the time, he sidetracks Ch'ao Kai without the latter knowing anything about it. The following passages serve as illustration:

Not long after Sung arrives at the mountain stronghold, Ch'ao orders his men to attack Chuchiachuang. He declares he will "personally lead the men to clean up that village." Sung promptly comes forward and says: "Elder brother is the chief of the mountain stronghold and should not take the risk lightly. I am not capable, but please allow me to lead an army with several good brothers to go down the mountain and attack Chuchiachuang."

On another occasion when Ch'ai Chin loses Kaot'angchou, Sung again approaches Ch'ao Kai and tells him: "Elder brother is the chief of the mountain stronghold and should not take any risk lightly. I am still indebted to the honorable Ch'ai and I am willing to go down the mountain."

Outwardly Sung pays lip service to Ch'ao Kai and addresses him as "the chief of the mountain stronghold." In reality he is after power with which he can control the army and make Ch'ao Kai sit back in the mountain stronghold and become a "commander without an army." Ch'ao later may have discerned Sung's way of handling the situation. Therefore, before attacking Tsengtou city he tells Sung that he will go down the mountain this time to relieve Sung from exhausting combat tasks. Look, even Ch'ao claims to go for Sung's sake. But he is trapped, shot by an arrow and dies of the fatal wound. Just imagine, even if Ch'ao were not killed he would in fact lose control of his men and therefore he would be just as good as being dead. Sung has succeeded where Kao Ch'iu has failed, proving that Sung and Kao are two of a kind but with Sung appearing more sinister than Kao.

Lou Ch'eng-chen (Shanghai No. 2 Dyestuff and Chemicals Works):

This being the case, we have to find a new definition for Sung Chiang's nickname "Welcome Rain." At the very moment when the reactionary feudal regime is ridden with problems and crumbling, he "promptly" sneaks into the revolutionary ranks, "promptly" grabs political capital, "promptly" excludes Ch'ao Kai, "promptly" pushes a capitulationist line, and "promptly" pledges his loyal service to the reactionary classes! As far as the reactionary rulers are concerned, he is downright "Welcome Rain" to them!

Lu Ho-hua (Vinylon Plant, Shanghai General Petrochemical Plant):

Let me add something to what Little Wang has just said. Dropping and disposing of Ch'ao Kai is the desire of Kao Ch'iu and his ilk, and something Sung Chiang does. At the same time,this is also the author's intent. In Chapter 1 of "Water Margin" the "appearance of 108 devils" foreshadows the exclusion of Ch'ao Kai. Chapter 71 relates how the "book of Heaven records 36 stars in the heavens and 72 stars on the earth." This is tantamount to saying that dropping Ch'ao Kai is a "wish of Heaven." No wonder that at the time Sung says gleefully: "The number is determined by Heaven and any dispute will go against Heavenly pronouncement."

Recently we examined some material related to the Liangshan peasant uprising, such as "Lost Events in Hsüan Ho," Kung K'ai's "In Praise of 36 Men including Sung Chiang" and other works which claim that the 36 men of Liangshan Mountain include "Iron Heavenly King Ch'ao Kai" or "Big Iron King Ch'ao Kai." Only "Water Margin" excludes Ch'ao Kai from the 36 stars in the heavens and drops him from the 108 people. Like Sung, the "Water Margin" author excluded Ch'ao from the 108 people, doing so for the very purpose of preaching surrender and promoting the capitulationist line.

Li Su-lan (Shanghai Children's Food Products Plant):

You've just discussed the struggle between Sung Chiang and Ch'ao Kai. This struggle is one between the two lines. Sung's move to oust Ch'ao Kai in essence is designed to clear the obstacle blocking his implementation of a capitulationist line. Since the line struggle is always a reflection within the revolutionary ranks of class struggle in society, it may be argued that the struggle between Sung and Ch'ao is essentially a reflection within the peasant insurgent army of the struggle between Ch'ao and Kao Ch'iu and his gang. This line struggle that is waged from within is often more complicated than overt class struggle. Many Liangshan revolutionaries are able to discern Kao Ch'iu but not Sung because the latter uses what he interprets as "justice" to hoodwink everybody.

In changing Ch'ao's "Chü-i T'ing" to "Chung-i T'ang" Sung, however, keeps the word "I." The meaning of assembly for justice is changed when the word "I" is placed after the word "Chung." Here Sung steals a beam and replaces it with another.

"Chü-i" implies one form of peasant uprisings in Chinese history. Using this as a banner the oppressed peasants organized their own contingents and declared war on the feudal ruling class. This assembly which embraces a generally identical goal, as depicted in "Water Margin," includes Lu Chih-shen of Two Dragon Mountain, Yen Shun of Clear Wind Mountain, Li Chung of Peach Blossom Mountain, and finally the small bands of insurgents to form a mighty Liangshan insurgent army. In Sung's interpretation of "Chung-i," "I" is subordinate to "Chung." This "I" uses the so-called "brotherly sentiment" to deceive

the peasant revolution army and paves the way for the surrender of a contingent bound by brotherly affection. In this sense, the "Chung" of capitulationism is necessarily accompanied by "I."

Han Ching-feng (Shanghai No. 7 Wireless Plant):

Sung's "I" is both reactionary and hypocritical. He wants the fighters of the insurgent army to treat him with "brotherly sentiment" while he himself is impassive, hypocritical and selfish. Li K'uei after all is devoted to Sung as far as a sense of justice goes. But when he expresses disapproval of Sung's obsession with royal amnesty and enlistment, Sung is so offended by Li's "rudeness" that he promptly orders Li to be taken out and beheaded. Although Sung is stopped from doing so by the assembled generals, Li is thrown into the dungeon. After Sung's surrender, one of his men out of righteous anger kills a "corrupt official," and is killed by Sung in turn. It may be recalled that when Sung was taken to the execution ground many peasant insurgents risked their lives to save him. Instead, an ungrateful Sung wanted to harm them and took them to the tiger's mouth, leaving them in the lurch, so their revolutionary movement would collapse. This in fact is not surprising at all for both "Chung" and "I" are determined by a class character, indicating that those who are loyal to the throne will hardly "talk about justice" in dealing with the peasant insurgents.

Wang Shu-li (Shanghai No. 17 Cotton Mill) and
Yu T'i-chün (Wusung Chemical Works):

Unfortunately, quite a few peasant insurgents at the time failed to perceive this and it is possible they were unable to do so. "Water Margin" mentions in a number of instances the use of poisonous wine. In my opinion, Sung's "justice" is just this sort of wine in its very poisonous and most dangerous form.

A staunch fighter like Li K'uei, a man known for his integrity and open-mindedness, his bitter hatred for evil-doings, did not die in combat -- during the insurgents' assault on the execution ground or in fierce fighting in his march on Tungching, or in his flight from the pursuing government troops. He died after he drank the poisonous wine offered by Sung, who called himself an "upright man" and "elder brother"! More than anything else this enables us to discern the capitulationists and the extent of harm done to the revolution by the theory trumpeted by them.

Engels once said, in a class society "morality always remains class morality." What Sung speaks of as "Chung-i" is but the morality of the landlord class. Once this is injected into the ranks of the peasant insurgent army it is bound to become the morality of the capitulationists, the moral code for strangling peasant uprisings.

T'an Chih-yao (Shanghai Boilers Plant):

Sung's capitulationist line has just been examined from every angle and I accept the result of the analysis. It should be noted, however, that where there is capitulation there must be opposition to it, and this is a general rule. Even the "Water Margin" author, who was in favor of amnesty and surrender, could not cover up this point. One section of the book, for instance, depicts the arrival of an imperial emissary named Ch'en in Liangshan Mountain to offer royal amnesty and enlistment and how his mission failed because of the violent objections on the part of Li K'uei and others. Personally escorting the emissary down the mountain stronghold, Sung secretly told him: "It is not that we have no desire to surrender, but that the bends around Liangshan Mountain are not known to officials who drafted the amnesty and enlistment offer." The "bends around Liangshan Mountain" referred to forces in the mountain stronghold that were opposed to surrender and which would make surrender moves not immediately successful.

As illustrations of the magnitude of these "bends," we can see that at first Li K'uei tore up the enlistment edict and abused the imperial emissary, followed by "outbursts" of Lu Chih-shen, Wu Sung and others.

When the capitulationist line pushed by Sung was finally successful, "around 3,000-5,000 people left." Since these people were reluctant to accept amnesty and enlistment, some of them would conceivably carry on the revolution. Following their departure, the "bends" around the Liangshan Mountain should have disappeared. Not at all. Before Li K'uei was murdered by Sung, didn't he heroically call for rebellion? This precisely shows the Liangshan revolution was betrayed, but the anti-capitulationist line upheld by Li K'uei and others would not disappear. "Where there are stones the sparks of fire will not be extinguished!" It is exactly the perpetuation of the sparks of revolution and their development into a raging conflagration and prairie fire that propel the wheel of history forward.

Wu An-t'ai (Shanghai Transport Company, No. 1 Depot):

This struggle between forces for surrender and those against it was later reflected in comments on "Water Margin." Many people laud the capitulationist Sung Chiang and praise "Water Margin," which is teaching material by negative example about capitulationism. As Chairman Mao, when criticizing the film "The Story of Wu Hsün," pointed out, "Acknowledging or tolerating this kind of praise is to acknowledge or tolerate the reactionary propaganda against the revolutionary struggles of the peasants, against Chinese history, and against the Chinese nation as proper propaganda." By the same token, on this question, some voiced objection against Sung Chiang and "Water Margin" as well as the capitulationist line preached by the novel. Lu Hsün was one of the outstanding representatives among these people. He said: "The book 'Water Margin' makes it quite clear that because they were not against the emperor, they accepted the offer of amnesty and enlistment when government troops

arrived and set out to fight other brigands for the state -- brigands who did not 'carry out Heaven's wish.' They were lackeys after all." This hit the nail right on the head.

Ku Hsiu-lin (Shanghai No. 3 Optical Plant):

The reason why Lu Hsün was able to express his manifestly pertinent views amid clamorous references to capitulationism in laudatory terms was that he adhered to the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method. We should learn from him, sum up the historical laws of class struggle, strive to raise our ability to distinguish Marxism-Leninism from revisionism, and revolutionaries from capitulationists, so as to carry the great cause of the proletarian revolution to its completion.

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Hsüeh-hsi Yü P'i-p'an Editor's Note

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 9, September 9, 1975)

In its 1975 No. 8 issue this journal carried an article "A Random Talk on Reading Some History of Literature."* Although the article pointed out that "Water Margin" is "ideologically inclined to oppose corrupt officials and not the emperor and even goes as far as to extol Sung Chiang's capitalist line," it still believed that "Water Margin" "is a full-length novel reflecting peasant uprisings" and "can help us recognize the strong points and weaknesses of peasant uprisings in feudal times as well as the historical lessons drawn from their failures." Recently, after we studied Chairman Mao's instruction and Lu Hsün's comment on "Water Margin," we realized that this viewpoint was wrong. The author of the article, having raised his thinking, criticized his original viewpoint and actively plunged into struggle. This journal hopes that the mass of readers will enthusiastically send in their manuscripts in order that together we may enhance our consciousness of class and line struggles and raise our Marxist theoretical level in the course of struggle.

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* See SPRCM No. 842.

The Legalist Line and Stability in Early Han

by

Ch'i Liang-hsiao (齐亮晓)

(Li-shih Yen-chiu /Historical Research/, No. 4, August 20, 1975)

In 202 B.C., Han Kao Tsu, Liu Pang, ascended to the throne after finally defeating Hsiang Yü. In a decree he cheerfully proclaimed: "The world is now at peace." When he later returned to his hometown, P'ei county, and met with the elders, he again sang exhilaratingly: "Now brave men are guarding all corners of the land." This gave vent to his aspirations to see a world well governed and in great order. Liu's brain trusters also summed up the historical experiences, exploring ways to "prevent war and bring peace to the people." This showed that they regarded it as a task of prime importance at that time to seek a stable political situation, consolidate the fruits of victory and intensify the domination of the landlord class. This demand, however, did not begin with Western Han; it was advanced in 221 B.C. after Ch'in Shih Huang unified the six states. Refuting Prime Minister Wang Wan's preposterous proposal to restore the vassalage system, Li Ssu pointed out that only when the prefectural and county system was enforced could "peace and tranquillity prevail." Accepting Li's suggestion, Ch'in Shih Huang stressed the need to "seek peace and tranquillity" at a time when the "world was initially brought to order" ("Biography of Ch'in Shih Huang, Historical Records"), and determinedly curbed the plots of the spokesmen of the slave-owning restorationist forces to stir up chaos in the world anew. Subsequently, in his many inscriptions on stone tablets, Ch'in Shih Huang repeatedly wrote such phrases as "peace and tranquillity for all people," "let the universe be a peaceful place for every man," "peace in the world" and "each and every man enjoys his life." (Ibid.) These voices for stability, repeated again and again throughout the ages, pose us an important question: Why was it that the newly emerging landlord class, having seized nationwide power through fierce struggle, needed so urgently a stable political situation? What vital significance did such a situation have in insuring the defeat of the old system by the new? What was the connection between a stable political situation and the Legalist political line? To sum up these relevant historical experiences is significant for us in stepping up our theoretical studies, promoting stability and unity, and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat today.

(I)

The defeat of an old social system by a new social system invariably covers a long historical process, replete with a complex and violent struggle between restoration and counter-restoration. This struggle is unfolded in an all-round manner in three spheres -- politics, economics, and ideological theory. Ch'in Shih Huang's establishment of a unified feudal state of centralized power symbolized the consolidation of the domination of the newly emerging landlord class on a nationwide scale. In order to strengthen his rule and

develop the feudal system, politically he "set up laws and standards and enforced strict discipline," so that "officials may observe them and know what they are doing, and do everything without doubt or suspicion." In other words, it was his hope that under the guidance of the Legalist line, officials at various levels from central to local would carry out their functions and duties, and the government could be run efficiently and smoothly. In the economic field, he ordered "the people to report on their land holdings and pay taxes," laid down the policy of "giving more attention to farming than to other less important occupations," and used political power to expand the system of feudal land ownership and greatly develop the landlord economy, aspiring to the day of stability and peace when "men and women apply themselves to their respective jobs happily, with each doing what he or she should do." ("Biography of Ch'in Shih Huang, Historical Records") In the ideological field, he stressed the present and slighted the past, adopted the determined revolutionary measure of "burning books and burying the Confucian scholars alive," and promulgated the order that "laws should be taught" and "officials be taken as teachers," hoping that "the people will transform themselves and observe the same standards" and "live within the bounds of the law." However, despite the many things Ch'in Shih Huang did in these fields, the Ch'in Dynasty did not have a long period of political stability. Remnants of the slave-owning aristocrats in hiding, with Chao Kao as their representative, craftily sneaked into the inner circles of the landlord class regime and, taking advantage of Ch'in Shih Huang's sudden illness and death, staged the Shach'iu coup d'etat, usurped a considerable part of power, and pursue a perverse course of action. This finally led to the eruption of the first big peasant uprising led by Ch'en Sheng and Wu Kuang in Chinese history.

History develops in the midst of contradictions and struggle and advances along a devious road. Having seized nationwide political power, the newly emerging landlord class hoped to develop the feudal system under a stable political situation, but failed in this first attempt to consolidate its rule with the collapse of the Ch'in Dynasty. The Western Han Dynasty, which rose after it, was similarly faced with the historical task of counter-attacking the slave-owning restorationist forces, consolidating the feudal state of centralized power and developing the feudal system. The situation in early Han was this: First, due to prolonged warfare resulting from the contention between Ch'u and Han, the social economy was badly devastated; second, princes outside the royal family and who possessed powerful armies, filled with ambitions, entered into a reactionary political alliance with slave-owners in industry and commerce and slave-owners of the Huns, poised at all times to stage large-scale armed rebellions aimed at dividing the country and restoring the old order; third, the newly emerging landlord class, having suffered from stunning blows from the peasant uprisings in the last days of Ch'in, was still wary of the strength of the peasantry; fourth, the fact that "it was Chao Kao who destroyed Ch'in" was clearly perceived by the Legalists at that time, including a brave warrior like Fan Kuai. To solve this series of contradictions, the crucial question of decisive significance was how, under the guidance of the Legalist line, to use the strength of

the government to change the system of ownership and develop the feudal economy on a massive scale in order to insure the defeat of the old system by the new and to beat back the invasion and plunder by the slave-owners of the Huns. To achieve these goals, the early Han rulers had a more urgent need than in the period of Ch'in Shih Huang for a stable political phase in which to build up their strength. Therefore, when Liu Pang proclaimed "the world is now at peace," he immediately ordered that "land and houses be awarded to those who perform meritorious services" and "titles, land and houses be given back to their previous owners," thus giving top priority to the rehabilitation and development of the economic and political forces of the landlord class in the administration of the Western Han Dynasty which had barely been established.

However, "wind continues to blow, though the trees want to be calm." Going against the policy of stability adopted by the central government of the Han Dynasty, some princes outside the royal family, who were given their present titles during the Ch'u-Han war, yearned for "world chaos" and were keen on creating a split and restoring the old order. Tsang T'u, Prince of Yen, and Ch'en Hsi, the acting prime minister, rose in rebellion with their troops in the north; Han Hsin, Prince of Ch'u, was about to start one in the south; and others like P'eng Yüeh, Ying Pu and Lu Wan also revolted in succession. So, there again appeared a situation of uncertainty when the "world is engulfed in fighting" and "success or defeat is unknown." Liu Pang was forced to mount the horse again and fight with his army in the north and south, even when he was taken ill. The rebellions by the princes outside the royal family were finally quelled. These seemingly powerful princes fell one after another rapidly because their splittist and restorationist moves went against the trends of historical development and the aspirations of the people to unity and stability.

After Liu Pang's death, power was assumed by Empress Lü, Emperor Wen and Emperor Ching. Taking full advantage of the favorable conditions created by the defeat of the rebellious princes by Liu Pang, they went ahead to vigorously implement policies aimed at enhancing stability. In a span of 50-60 years, the first so-called "prosperous period" of the landlord class finally emerged and laid a strong foundation for a mighty Western Han empire to be built by Emperor Wu later on.

(II)

As mentioned above, the landlord class, having established a unified feudal state of centralized power, was faced with the formidable task of consolidating and developing its victories and thoroughly defeating the slave-owning restorationist forces. So, after Han Kao Tsu rebuilt a unified Western Han political structure, the task left unfulfilled by the Ch'in Dynasty was brought to the agenda once again. This then determined the historical necessity for "Han to inherit the Ch'in system." On entering Hsienyang, Liu Pang ordered "Hsiao Ho to collect all the books and documents in the house of the Ch'in prime minister" as a necessary step for the adoption of the Ch'in system by the Western Han Dynasty. When Liu Pang ascended to the throne, he again ordered

Hsiao Ho and others to "draft laws" and "draw up regulations" using the Ch'in system as the blueprint. Even the code of rituals drafted by Shu Sun-tung resembled that of Ch'in. This showed that Ch'in Shih Huang's political and economic systems were properly preserved and continued in the line of rule by law followed by Liu Pang and Hsiao Ho. After they died, Empress Lü and Ts'ao Ts'an "changed nothing and abided by the rules set by Hsiao Ho," and thoroughly implemented the fixed line and policies. At that time a folksong read: "Hsiao Ho's laws are clearly defined; when Ts'ao Ts'an takes over as prime minister, he fully observes them, and a calm and peaceful atmosphere appears among the people." This is to say that as Empress Lü and Ts'ao Ts'an "fully observe" the Legalist line laid down by Liu Pang and Hsiao Ho, a "calm" and stable political phase emerged. It can be seen that what was called a policy of stability was a concrete manifestation of the strict adherence to the fixed Legalist line by the landlord class.

This policy of stability not only meant "full observance" of the "laws and decrees" as "clearly defined" by Han Kao Tsu, but essentially speaking, it also meant "taking over intact" the "laws and decrees" of Ch'in Shih Huang as they were "passed down to later generations." In form or appearance, however, these laws and decrees had unexpectedly special features of their own, namely, a profound Huang-Lao /Taoist/ color. And these were new epochal features given by history.

The great peasant uprisings toward the end of Ch'in paved the way for the implementation of the Legalist line in early Han. The Ch'in and Han dynasties differed in one major aspect: Whereas Western Han was established by using the fruits of the peasant revolution, Ch'in Shih Huang had never seen the image of the insurgent peasants on the stage of history. That was why Ch'in Shih Huang dared to openly advertise his own landlord class character for the purpose of drawing a clear line of distinction with the slave-owners. On the other hand, statesmen in early Han often concealed their landlord class character and advertised their advocacy of "sharing the break with the people." This was the decisive reason why the policy of stability adopted by Western Han had the Huang-Lao color.

A prominent feature of the "Huang-Lao doctrine" was that it sought refuge under Huang Ti and Lao Tzu to conceal its direct connection between itself and the actual struggle. Another characteristic was its advocacy of "inactivity," calling for "one's sacrifice and letting things run their own natural course." These two characteristics had to be firmly grasped in carrying out the policy of stability in early Han. Marx once said: "The degree of implementation of a theory in a state depends on the degree of satisfaction of the needs of that state by the theory." (Marx, "Introduction to 'A Critique of Hegelian Philosophy of Right'") Since the "Huang-Lao doctrine" could satisfy the needs of a policy of stability, it became quite dominant for a time. Ts'ao Ts'an "used the Huang-Lao technique in running the government"; Empress Lü "was inactive," Emperor Wen "cultivated himself in the Huang-Lao instructions" and "ruled by inaction"; and the wife of Emperor Wen, Empress Tou, also "liked the teachings of Huang Ti and

Lao Tzu, so the Emperor (Ching) and the Crown Prince (Wu) and the Tous were all obliged to read Huang Ti and Lao Tzu and respect their teachings." As a result, the "Huang-Lao doctrine" prevailed in Western Han for 60 years, becoming as it did the guiding thought as well as the legal cloak for the rulers in pushing a policy of stability.

It must be pointed out that "inaction" in the "Huang-Lao doctrine" did not mean exactly that. In "Hsin Yü," Lu Chia said: "Doing nothing actually means doing something." "Inaction" not only was a kind of action in "abiding by all past rules and regulations," but also laid the groundwork for doing something great in the future.

The appearance of a stable situation in the periods of Empress Lü and Emperors Wen and Ching was also related to the fact that the statesmen of the landlord class in early Han upheld a correct organizational line after drawing upon the lessons of Ch'in's fall.

Historical facts show that one of the very important reasons why the Ch'in Dynasty could not be stabilized and why Chao Kao was able to "kill the descendants of Ch'in and destroy their empire" ("Inquiry into Kai Yü Ts'ung," Vol. 41) was that Ch'in Shih Huang was unable to form a continuous Legalist leadership group. Liu Pang attached major importance to this painful lesson and therefore to selecting and promoting men of talent in the course of struggle in order to continue to reinforce the central leadership group. This was confirmed in that set of famous questions and answers on why Liu was able to gain the world and Hsiang lost it, when Liu said he gained the world because he was able to use "men of outstanding caliber." On the eve of his death, Liu designated the time-tested Legalists Ts'ao Ts'an, Chou Po, Wang Ling and Ch'en Ping as successors to Hsiao Ho in holding central military and political power. This organizationally insured the smooth continuation of the Legalist line, prevented the surprise attack by conspirators like Chao Kao, and led to the formation of a stable leadership core and a stable political situation. This carefully conceived Legalist principle of using people was consistently upheld during the reigns of Empress Lü and Emperors Wen and Ching. Emperor Wen, apart from continuing to use the experienced Ch'en P'ing and Chou Po as assistant prime ministers, also selected such young Legalists as Chia I and Ch'ao Ts'o to fill important posts in the central government. This correct organizational line not only took account of the need to fully utilize the experiences of the Legalists of the older generation, but also took note of the need to continue to select and bring up as successors young Legalists who matured in the course of struggle. This enabled the Western Han central government to maintain a relatively consistent and strong leadership group, which undoubtedly played a vital role in consolidating the fruits of victory and bringing about a stable situation.

(III)

The policy of stability in early Han consisted of three key aspects: namely, "stress agriculture and restrain commerce," restrict and attack the vassalage privileges of the princes, and make active

preparations for defeating the Huns. These three aspects were inseparably inter-related.

Beginning with Liu Pang, the Western Han rulers pursued the policy of "stressing agriculture and restraining commerce." By the time of Empress Lü and Emperor Hui, the rural economy began to recover, as "people engaged themselves in farming and food and clothing were grown in abundance." ("Biography of Empress Lü, Historical Records") During the reigns of Emperors Wen and Ching, this policy continued to be energetically pursued. Imperial decrees were issued again and again stressing "agriculture as the foundation of the empire." ("Chronicles of Emperor Wen, History of Han") Moreover, Chia I proposed the policy of "enriching and stabilizing the empire" as the basic objective, in other words, to develop the feudal economy, increase grain production, build up grain stocks in order to consolidate the feudal state of centralized power and provide the stable political situation with a strong material basis. Therefore, the development of agricultural production was not only an economic but also a political question. He further pointed out that only when the feudal state held a large amount of material wealth could it turn from defensive to offensive and frustrate the harassments by the Hun slave-owners. He said: "Building up the material reserves concerns the lifeline of the empire. If grain stocks are abundant and there is a financial surplus, is there anything which cannot be accomplished? In that case, we shall take when we attack, prove impenetrable when we defend ourselves, and win any war that has to be fought." ("Treatise of Agriculture, History of Han") Another Legalist Ch'ao Ts'o also proposed to take the development of agricultural production as the "basic political objective" and regard "exploring additional financial revenues" as the basic measure. To this end, he formulated a policy "according priority to grain." The proposals by both Chia I and Ch'ao Ts'o were accepted by Emperor Wen. With a view to "encouraging people to go back to the land," the Han Dynasty adopted a series of measures, such as promoting the use of draft cattle, extending the application of iron farm tools, building water conservation works, resettling people in sparsely populated areas, and rewarding government officials who devoted more attention to agriculture. Moreover, with respect to taxation, corvee and military service, some adjustments and reforms were introduced to boost the peasants' enthusiasm for production and to encourage them to provide the feudal state and the landlord class with more surplus products. These measures were also aimed at making the peasants attach themselves to the land, so that they would not "leave their homes lightly" or rebel because of hunger. These measures were rather obvious in their class character.

"Restraining commerce" served the purpose of "stressing agriculture, and was a means of waging struggle against "merchants who acquire farmers." The early Han rulers imposed heavy taxes on merchants and forbade them to enter government service. These and other measures were essentially measures of dictatorship exercised by the landlord class over the slave-owners in industry and commerce. However, because the problem of ownership was not solved, the phenomenon of merchants acquiring peasants remained serious. Later on, Emperor Wu further introduced a series of policies which dealt more effective blows to the slave-owners in industry and commerce, such as handsomely rewarding those who reported on merchants evading taxes,

issuing a unified currency, putting the iron and salt industries under government management, and taking goods which were in abundant supply in one area and supplying them to one that was in short supply. In the field of industry and commerce, he abolished ownership by the slave-owners. It was only then that victories were won in basically destroying the restorationist forces of the slave-owners in industry and commerce.

With Liu Pang putting down the rebellions by princes outside the royal family, the Han Dynasty was accorded relatively favorable conditions for the implementation of a policy of stability. However, as Liu Pang sensed the threat of the princes outside the royal family and who possessed troops and might revolt and as he mistakenly believed that Ch'in's fall was "due to its isolation," he conferred the title of prince on a large number of his royal family, entrusting the sons and nephews of the Liu family with the heavy responsibility of guarding the central government with the hope that they might form a shield protecting the Western Han Dynasty. But the result was contrary to his desire. These princes, having obtained vassalage rights, took the old road of the princes outside the royal family and all frantically developed their own political, economic and military forces, setting up their own independent kingdoms. In the land under their control, "the Han laws and decrees do not work." ("Biography of Chia I, History of Han") This gravely threatened the stability and unity of the feudal state of centralized power. Collaborating with merchants and slave-owners, they became the representatives of the restorationist forces of the slave-owners. They also collaborated with the slave-owning nobles of the Huns and sought their assistance in realizing their ambitions to create a split and restore the old order through armed rebellions; hence they became the spies of the slave-owners forces of the Huns hiding in the Han imperial court. In this way, with the princes as the center, reactionary restorationist forces were formed with the participation of the slave-owners in industry and commerce and with ties with the slave-owning aristocrats of the Huns. The three aspects of the policy of stability pursued by the Han Dynasty -- "stress agriculture and restrain commerce," restrict and attack the princes, and actively prepare to defeat the Huns -- were precisely a reflection of the situation of struggle at that time. These three aspects were organically inter-related. "Restrain commerce" was not only for the purpose of "stressing agriculture" but also for the purpose of suppressing the merchants who "because of their wealth maintained illicit relations with the princes." Restricting and attacking the princes were also designed to attack the slave-owners in industry and commerce who collaborated with them. At the same time, the history of rebellions by princes outside the royal family proved: "Han Hsin, who relied on the barbarians outside the border, rebelled," ("Biography of Chia I, History of Han") and the princes of the royal family were now following in their footsteps. For this reason, only by removing the threat posed by the princes could the Han Dynasty turn its full attention to counter-attacking the unceasing harassments by the Huns. In short, unless the independent kingdoms of the princes were crushed it was impossible to preserve the country's unity and stability, develop the feudal economy, strengthen the preparations against war, and win the victory in resisting the invasion from the Huns. These relations were perceived by the Legalists in early Han. While calling for vigorous

development of the feudal economy, they grasped this central link -- restrict and attack the princes -- as the focal point of struggle. In his noted thesis, "Policy for Order and Security," Chia I, hitting the nail on the head, pointed out: To achieve "security and order," it would be necessary first of all to cut into the power of the princes. He said: "When trouble is made, it must be removed," "power and a code of laws are the axes wielded by the ruler. Now the princes are all trouble-makers." Only by wielding the "code of laws" as a big axe was it possible to solve the problem of rebellions by the princes. He proposed the strategy of "cutting a big fiefdom into several smaller ones." Emperor Wen paid serious attention to and accepted this proposal. He divided Ch'i into six states and Huainan into three, thus to a certain extent weakening the power of the princes. After Chia I, Ch'ao Ts'o proposed the "policy of reducing the territories of the vassals." He pointed out: "If you reduce their territories today, they will rebel; if you do not, they rebel just the same. If you reduce their territories, they will rebel sooner and pose a smaller threat; if you do not reduce their territories, they will rebel later and pose a bigger threat." ("Biography of Ch'ao Ts'o, History of Han") Emperor Ching accepted this proposal and first reduced the size of the fiefs owned by the Prince of Chao, the Prince of Chiaohsi and the Prince of Ch'u. After quelling the "rebellions of the seven states" including Wu and Ch'u, he ruled that "the princes shall not rule over their land again," and the political and military affairs of these states were handled by officials appointed by the central government. The policy of restricting and attacking the princes pursued during the period of Emperor Ching consolidated the authority of the central government and strengthened the unity of the country as well as further developing the stable situation at that time.

A long period of stability was achieved only because the Western Han Dynasty firmly implemented the various policies under the guidance of the Legalist line. In this stable situation the feudal economy was rapidly rehabilitated and developed, altering the situation in which fields lay in waste, the state treasury was empty, "the Son of Heaven could not afford fine wine and horses and the ministers and generals had to ride on cattle-drawn carts" in the days of early Han. By the time Emperor Wu came to the throne, life was vastly improved, "with money to spare in the state treasury," "state granaries were filled with grain," and "horses neighed in the streets and crowds were seen in the fields." In a span of a few decades the landlord class built up a strong economic might. By relying on this might, Emperor Wu unleashed a full-scale war against the Huns. After three decisive campaigns, the Huns who appeared powerful and indefatigable since early Han were trounced, the remnant forces of the princes and slave-owners in industry and commerce were thwarted, and a decisive victory was won in the struggle against restoration. By then, the unified feudal state of centralized power, whose foundation stone was laid by Ch'in Shih Huang, became consolidated, and Chinese feudal society entered the first peak of development. The Western Han Dynasty appeared in the history of the world with a high level of civilization and prosperity.

The landlord class was an exploiting class mounting the political stage after succeeding the slave-owners. Dealing with the distinction

between proletarian and bourgeois revolutions, Stalin pointed out that one of the vital aspects was: "The bourgeois revolution was usually consummated with the seizure of political power; the proletarian revolution began with it." ("On Several Problems of Leninism") Like the bourgeois revolution, the revolution of the landlord class did not aim at wiping out the system of exploitation but at replacing an old system of exploitation with a new one. After they seized nationwide power, their main historical task was fulfilled. For this reason, the policy of stability pursued in early Han inevitably bore the characteristics of that time and class. Although its positive aspect was the leading aspect, it nevertheless contained conservative factors. At the same time, since it was a policy of the landlord class, it brought a "prosperous period" only for the landlord class. The vast numbers of peasants still had to "toil without a day's break throughout the four seasons," diligently creating social wealth. Yet their life was no better than that of beasts of burden. They still had to perform corvee and military service, suffering from all sorts of exploitation in various forms. In a society under the system of exploitation, every step forward in history was gained at a big price paid by the laboring people.

In order to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, carry out the socialist revolution in a deep-going manner, and quicken the pace of socialist construction, we must likewise actively enhance stability and unity and rely on the broad masses in a common struggle. The excellent situation of stability and unity for our proletariat is essentially different from that in any historical period of the past, and our period is unmatched by all previous prosperous periods. Let us, under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, unite and fight and win still greater victories.

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Pre-Ch'in Legalists on War Preparedness -- A Tentative Discussion

by

Hung Ch'eng (洪城)

(Li-shih Yen-chiu /Historical Research/, No. 4, August 20, 1975)

The Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods were periods of momentous social changes in our country when the slave system was replaced by the feudal system. Driven by the roaring waves of slave uprisings, the newly emerging landlord class waged a fierce struggle against the declining slave-owning class in the economic, political, ideological and other fields. "When politics develop to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep the obstacles from the way." ("On Protracted War") The contradiction between the newly emerging landlord and the slave-owning class gradually developed to the stage where it could not be solved short of military struggle. At the same time, the newly emerging landlord classes in various states were carrying out in different degrees social reforms and developing the feudal forces. Meanwhile, mutual contention and struggle for annexation among them also assumed serious proportions. History records that "during the Spring and Autumn period, 36 state rulers were slain, 52 states were subjugated, and a countless number of princes had to flee being unable to protect their dominions."* By the Warring States period, wars were fought on a larger scale and more frequently. These struggles indicated that the influence of the Son of Heaven of Chou under the slave system dwindled and eventually vanished, and the country, divided among the principalities, was gradually heading toward unity. Consequently the success or failure of military struggles became a prime matter of political survival. Thus problems of war preparations rose to an important position in the daily agenda of the newly emerging landlord class on seizing political power.

The thinking of pre-Ch'in Legalists on war preparation emerged and developed under the conditions of these class struggles and wars and in the course of struggle to criticize the Confucian fallacies against war preparedness. Their views and practice about war preparedness provide us with innumerable beneficial historical experiences, which we should analyze and sum up scientifically in the service of our struggle today.

(I)

In the course of the fierce struggles at that time, the pre-Ch'in Legalists to a definite extent saw the inevitability of war and

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* "Preface by the Great Historian, Historical Records."

stressed the importance of war preparedness. They held that after seizing political power, the newly emerging landlord class could not afford to "disarm" but must prepare against war. They pointed out explicitly: "The security of a state hinges on preparedness as a prerequisite."* "The security of a state" refers to the security of a state of the landlord class; "preparedness" means raising vigilance and strengthening preparations against war; and "prerequisite" means a matter of top importance. All this is to say that strengthening preparations against war is the most important matter for protecting the state and consolidating political power.

The reason why pre-Ch'in Legalists stressed war preparedness and raised it to the position where it became a prerequisite for the security of the state was, first, their recognition that, having seized political power, the newly emerging landlord class would not have a peaceful time but would face "a time of disturbances," and that "during this age of major conflicts" there was the danger of losing the political power it had gained. They believed that "those who do not prepare against war will lose,"** and that "they can avert disasters only when they maintain preparedness, set up defense and mobilize the people to resist aggression."*** Thus the newly emerging landlord class was warned that if it made no preparations against war and make light of the war that might break out, it would face the danger of losing its state. This analysis conformed to the reality of class struggle at that time. If the newly emerging landlord class did not make preparations against war, not only would it fail to preserve and strengthen itself during wars of annexation among the princes, but it would fail to prevent and crush the armed subversion and counterrevolutionary restoration by the slave-owning nobles. The war preparedness thinking of the pre-Ch'in Legalists reflected the demand of the newly emerging landlord class for a consolidated and developed feudal regime.

The pre-Ch'in Legalists also contended: To prevent restoration by slave-owners and resist external aggression, a state could not rely on a large state nor on benevolence and righteousness but must rely on the armed might held in its hands. Shang Yang's proposal "to eliminate war with war," namely, to use revolutionary violence to deal with counterrevolutionary violence, reflected in a concentrated manner their guiding thought on the question of war preparation. Hsün K'uang once forcefully refuted the so-called theory that "a small state should imitate a large state." He said: "If you please a large state by offering it precious goods, it will take the goods but will not reciprocate by offering you friendship; if you sign a pact with it, it will certainly not honor it; if you give it part of your land,

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* "Expecting the Enemy, Wu Tzu."

** "Answering King Wei, Sun Pin's Art of War."

*** "Farming and War, Book of Lord Shang."

you will lose your land without satisfying its appetite. The more you please it, the more it wants to invade you until it takes over all of your material resources and land."* This is to say that a large state's appetite is insatisfiable and it may tear up the agreement you sign with it at any time. Learning from a large state and practicing capitulationism will lead to depletion of all material resources and national subjugation.

As regards the so-called theory of "resisting the enemy with benevolence and righteousness," Han Fei, taking the two states of Hsü and Lu as an example, pointed out: King Yen of Hsü relied on benevolence and righteousness and finally saw his state destroyed by the state of Ch'u. Lu did not actively prepare against war; when it was attacked by Ch'i, it sent Tzu Kung to persuade Ch'i to stop the invasion with benevolence and righteousness, but the result was that it was heavily battered by Ch'i. Therefore, Han Fei believed that "now the issue is settled by spirit and strength"** and that "benevolence and righteousness, reasoning and wisdom are not to be relied upon to preserve a state."** As a matter of fact, the so-called Confucian theory of "benevolence and righteousness" was nothing but a deceptive theory, designed to make the newly emerging landlord class to "follow benevolence and righteousness and disarm the three services,"*** so that the slave-owning class might "take up arms to defend its community."**** It could not be more fitting for the pre-Ch'in Legalists to denounce the Confucian theory of "benevolence and righteousness" as "the theory of a fool or imposter" and "theory leading to national subjugation."

Openly calling for "doing away with war through war," the pre-Ch'in Legalists pointed out that the "security of a state" must be insured by "preparedness," by active propaganda about war preparations, thereby effectively exposing and criticizing the various fallacies of the Confucians against war preparations, theoretically arming the newly emerging landlord class and raising people's awareness of the need to prepare against war. This exerted important effects on the newly emerging landlord class in gaining military victories and in consolidating and developing the newborn feudal political power.

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* "Enriching a State, Hsün Tzu."

** "Five Vermin, Han Fei Tzu."

*** "Kao Tzu Part II, Mencius."

**** "Eight-Year Reign of Duke Ai, Tso Commentary."

(II)

Economic conditions serve as the material basis of war, and the preparation of war materials is a vital aspect of preparedness against war. Although the pre-Ch'in Legalists were still unable to recognize this point in an all-round and dialectical way in the context of the military-economic relationship, from the practice of war they initially sensed that whether or not there were adequate material reserves was an important condition bearing on whether or not a mighty defensive capability could be maintained and whether or not war could be successfully conducted.

The book "Kuan Tzu" pointed out: "A state is defended by cities. Cities are defended by soldiers, and soldiers come from the people. The people can defend themselves only when they have grain. If fields are not tilled, cities cannot be defended."* It was held that without being guaranteed by the supply of grain, the defense of a city could not be solid. Sun Wu, on the basis of war experience, also asserted that "an army would perish without equipment, grain and reserves."** These thoughts reflected in a certain degree the position of material preparation in war preparedness and its importance to war. By the Warring States period, with the newly emerging landlord class generally seizing political power and with many slaves turned into peasants adhering to the feudal system, the standing armies of various states were substantially increased. As for the form of fighting, field battles by infantry and cavalry replaced the chariot battles during the Spring and Autumn period. In wars among the various states, both sides used an army usually numbering several hundred thousand or even up to a million men. Such large-scale wars further increased the dependence on the material basis. Han Fei, seeing this, stated: "Those who have no city fortifications, no material reserves and few material resources and who make no preparations for war and under-estimate the attacker will perish."*** The Legalists placed the emphasis on the important role of the material basis in war after summing up the experience of war at that time, an emphasis that more or less objectively reflected the relationship between war and economic conditions. To wage and win a war, it is necessary to have adequate material reserves as a shield, and in this there is no exception in ancient and modern times, in China and elsewhere. Just as Lenin pointed out: "To wage war seriously, it is necessary to have a solid and organized rear. Without adequate armament, adequate supplies and training, even the best army and people most loyal to the revolutionary cause would be promptly wiped out by the enemy." ("Tread on Solid Ground")

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* "Building Up Power, Kuan Tzu."

** "Military Struggle, Sun Tzu."

*** "Signs of Destruction, Han Fei Tzu."

As to the question of how to provide war preparations with a material guarantee, the pre-Ch'in Legalists advanced a great deal of ideas, the core of which was "farming and war," namely, what Shang Yang pointed out: "A state owes its rise to farming and war."* To develop agriculture and run the military establishment well was taken as the basic policy for making a state rich economically and strong militarily. Han Fei also pointed out that if a state was successful in "developing agriculture and running its military machine," even "a powerful state with ten thousand chariots will not dare to invade it."** While carrying out his political reforms in the state of Ch'in, Shang Yang firmly pushed the policy of "farming and war," promoting "respect for people engaged in farming and war" and rewarding those who performed merits in these two fields. This promptly changed the backward situation of Ch'in where the population was large but its army was weak and the territory was large but its grain yield was low, and laid a strong material foundation for Ch'in to win a series of victories in war later.

In the thinking of pre-Ch'in Legalists on war preparedness, "farming and war" was placed in a prominent position. This was not accidental. "Agriculture was the decisive production sector of the whole ancient world." (Engels, "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State") In view of the relatively simple war instruments, agriculture not only supplied the most important material -- grain, but was the foundation for the production of other military supplies. To grasp agriculture was to basically solve the problem of material preparations for war. The policy of "farming and war" pushed by the pre-Ch'in Legalists thus linked to a definite degree war preparations and war operations with the development of agricultural production and linked measures to make a state rich economically and strong militarily with measures to consolidate the political power of the newly emerging landlord class.

"War is not only a military and political race, but also an economic race." ("Guerrilla Zones May Also Carry Out Production") To a great extent the material basis influences the progress and outcome of war. And to a definite extent the viewpoint of pre-Ch'in Legalists concerning the development of agriculture and laying a good material basis for war preparations expresses the vital significance of the economic basis to war preparations. Ideologically it forcefully criticized the Confucian reactionary fallacies such as "incomplete city fortifications and a weak army will not ruin a state, nor will leaving the fields untended and gathering no wealth and material resources harm it"*** and "part with the military equipment and food." In practice, it guaranteed war preparations

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* "Farming and War, Book of Lord Shang."

** "Five Vermin, Han Fei Tzu."

*** "Li Lou, Mencius."

and promoted the development of the feudal economy. However, it was impossible for the pre-Ch'in Legalists, suffering from class and historical limitations, to correctly recognize and handle the dialectical relationship between consciousness and matter and between man and weapons. It was obviously a mistake for them to one-sidedly exaggerate the role of weapons in some of their statements.

(III)

In war preparations, the newly emerging landlord class attached relatively great importance to using the strength of the people. It was held: "When war is won, it is because the people are put to use."* In other words, victory could be gained only by making full use of the strength of the people. Moreover, Hsün K'uang pointed out explicitly: "The basic strategy for using an army in war is unifying the people."** This means that the basic question of raising an army to fight a war is to concentrate and unify the strength of the people. He graphically illustrated the importance of "unifying the people" to war in this way: If the bow and the arrow did not fit each other, even Hou Ts'ui, who was a good archer, could not use the arrow to hit a minute target; if the six horses did not gallop in harmony, even Tsao Fu, who was a good carriage driver, could not drive it over a long distance; if the people were disobedient, even King T'ang and King Wu could not win a war. Therefore, Hsün K'uang said: "Those who rule a state enrich it when they use the strength of the people, make it strong when the people are willing to die for it, and make it glorious when the people are devoted to it. Those who have these three gains shall have the whole world under them; those who lose these three gains will lose the world."*** Because he had this understanding, he felt that only by making use of the strength of the people and winning their hearts was it possible to make a success of war preparations.

In order to fully utilize the strength of the people, the pre-Ch'in Legalists in the course of war preparations mostly favored using the method of "training troops among the people" to expand the sources of manpower. Moreover, they suggested that "the way to use an army is to train it first,"**** thereby calling attention to the training of troops. While in the state of Ch'i, Kuan Chung "ran the administration along military lines." Administratively five families were grouped into a unit; militarily five people were grouped into a unit. The administrative structure was unified with the military structure. In peace time people and soldiers labored and drilled together. When war

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* "Strict Order, Kuan Tzu."

** "Discussion of Military Affairs, Hsün Tzu."

*** "Hegemon [illegible], Hsün Tzu."

**** "Ruling an Army, Wu Tzu."

came they fought together. "When fighting went on at night, they could hear each other, and no confusion was caused; when fighting went on in the daytime, they could see each other and were willing to fight and die together." In this way, "the army and the people defended and attacked together."* While in the state of Ch'in, Shang Yang also favored organizing men and women, young and old, at the time of the enemy's invasion, and forming three armies composed of able-bodied men, able-bodied women, and the old and feeble to resist the enemy.**

The pre-Ch'in Legalists took the view that the key to utilizing the strength of the people lay in winning their hearts, and called for the adoption of such policies as "benefiting the people" and "loving the people" to gain their support. Hsün K'uang said: "If you do not love the people and do nothing to benefit them, it is impossible to ask them to love you. When the people do not love you, it is impossible to ask them to work and die for you. When the people do not work and die for you, it is impossible to have a strong army and fortified cities."*** This is to say that to make the soldiers "work and die for you," it is necessary to "benefit the people" and "love the people." Many Legalist military experts not only favored rewards and punishments and rewarding military merits but, in order to boost the morale and win the hearts of the soldiers, they often charged in the lead, "so the rank and file of the three services obey orders and die without hesitation."****

The fact that pre-Ch'in Legalists were able to turn their attention to using the strength of the people was related to the historical conditions at that time. During the period of transition from the slave system to the feudal system, despite the existence of class antagonism between the newly emerging landlord class and the laboring people, such a contradiction had not as yet risen to be the principal contradiction in society. When the newly emerging landlord class strengthened war preparations, overthrew the slave system, and consolidated and developed the feudal political power, this objectively helped the broad masses of laboring people free themselves from slavery. That is why it could gain definite support from the people. However, because the pre-Ch'in Legalists were after all representatives of the exploiting class, their basic objective of strengthening war preparations and consolidating the political power of the landlord class was to substitute the rule of the landlord class over the peasants for the rule of slave-owners over slaves. This made it inevitable that what

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* "History of Ch'i, Warring States."

** "Defense, Book of Lord Shang."

*** "The Way of the Sovereign, Hsün Tzu."

**** "Strategy, Book of Lord Shang."

they said about "benefiting the people" and "loving the people" was somewhat deceptive, that is, it was a stratagem used only to defend feudal domination and a means of asking the people to work and die for the newly emerging landlord class. At the same time, as far as the world outlook was concerned, they also could not look upon the masses of people as masters of history. Their attitude toward the masses of the people could well be illustrated by a statement made by Sun Pin on the positions of the sovereign, the generals and the soldiers and their inter-relationships. He said: "To know the condition of an army, one must know the way in which the bow and the arrow are used. The arrow may be compared to soldiers; the bow to the generals. The user of the bow and the arrow is the sovereign."* Although he regarded soldiers, generals and the sovereign as equally important, nevertheless he mainly emphasized the role of the sovereign and generals. As to the question of why pre-Ch'in Legalists advocated the use of the strength of the people,we can correctly understand it only when we analyze and study it in the context of the historical conditions and class relationships at that time.

(IV)

Another most important element of the war preparedness thinking of pre-Ch'in Legalists is that making a success of politics at home is fundamental to carrying out good war preparations.

While in the state of Wei, Wu Ch'i once heard Marquis Wu of Wei brag about the "defensibility of the mountains and rivers" in his state, regarding them as the "gems of Wei." Thereupon, Wu Ch'i indicated that the security of a state did not depend on the defensibility of mountains and rivers but on good political administration. Hsün K'uang also pointed out that the state of Ch'u had powerful weapons and strong armor as well as mountains and rivers serving as natural barriers. Yet in several battles with Ch'in, it lost them all and even could not protect some of its cities. The basic reason was that it was politically corrupt. Similar views were advanced by other Legalists. They held: "War tactics are rooted in good political administration."** "When a state is well governed, it cannot be attacked,"*** "when a state is cultivated in the Way and safeguards the laws, it has a government that will win."**** "Governed," "Way" and "government" emphasized here principally refer to politics. In a class society, politics is concrete class politics. As representatives of the newly emerging

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* "Condition of An Army, Sun Pin's Art of War."

** "War Tactics, Book of Lord Shang."

*** "Five Vermin, Han Fei Tzu."

**** "Terrain, Sun Tzu."

landlord class, pre-Ch'in Legalists basically referred to the need to adhere to a line of rule by law when they stressed politics.

The line of rule by law exists in opposition to the Confucian line of "restraining oneself and returning to propriety" espoused by the declining slave-owning class. It is a line that favors reform and progress and oppose restoration and regression. As it went along with the orientation of historical development, it objectively reflected the interests and wishes of the people. For this reason, whether to adhere to a line of rule by law decided whether good preparations against war could be made. Shang Yang said: "When the rule by law is enforced before military action starts, customs will be changed; and when customs are changed, tools for war will be acquired."* That is to say that only by enforcing the rule of law was it possible to change the customs and make a success of preparing against war.

When people follow different lines, they differ in their understanding of war preparations and in ways of approaching them, and the results will naturally be different. At that time a state which pushed the line of rule by law became rich and strong, was able to win greater support from the masses of people, to make good preparations against war and to win a war. On the contrary, a state which failed to do so became poor and weak and could neither gain the support of the people nor make a success of preparations against war. Once the line was changed, even a state which originally practiced the rule by law would cease making preparations against war and turn from strong to weak. The changes of the state of Wei provide a vivid historical proof. In the early Warring States period, as it pushed the line of rule by law, Wei was relatively strong and once claimed that "no state is richer than Wei." Marquis Wen of Wei appointed Wu Ch'i a great general guarding Hsiho. Wu Ch'i "fought with the princes in 76 big battles, winning 64 of them and stalemating in the rest. He opened up land on four sides, covering a thousand miles."** However, when Wei later changed its line, its power declined with each passing day. By the time of King Liang Hui, it "lost three wars abroad, the Crown Prince was captured, senior generals were killed, and the state became extremely weak."*** Ch'i, Ch'u and other states also had similar historical experiences. Only Ch'in was the exception. In the more than a hundred years from Duke Hsiao to Ch'in Shih Huang, although there were times when restorationist forces of slave-owners got the upper hand, "the laws of Ch'in were not defeated, though Lord Shang had died." Basically it adhered to a line of rule by law and, becoming stronger with every passing day, it finally unified the whole of China. On this historical phenomenon,

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* "Laying the Foundation, Book of Lord Shang."

** "Planning for a State, Wu Tzu."

*** "The Wei Family, Historical Records."

Han Fei made a rather fair comment: "There is no state which is forever strong, and no state which is forever weak. When those who rule are strong in respecting the laws, the state will be strong; otherwise, it will be weak."* "The three states of Tsin became weak and beset with disorder because they had faith in benevolence and righteousness; Ch'in had no faith in them and so became well-governed and strong."** Thus, the causes of rise and fall, victory and defeat were explained from the angle of rule by law.

Because they suffered from epochal and class limitations, pre-Ch'in Legalists were unable to comprehend the relationship between the line and war preparations, let alone see the fact that the line decided everything. Yet from the practice of government and war, they took note of the vital role of politics to war preparations, coming to the realization that the basic way to make good preparations against war was to stick to the rule of law. This then provided a relatively clear orientation for war preparations as advocated by the pre-Ch'in Legalists.

The thinking of pre-Ch'in Legalists on war preparedness is extremely rich in content. Here only an initial inquiry has been made into it. It will still be necessary to further study it in greater breadth and depth.

As an ideological weapon for the newly emerging landlord class to consolidate its political power, the war preparedness thinking of pre-Ch'in Legalists not only played an important role at that time, but also produced a relatively great influence on latter-day Legalists. Although the war preparedness thinking of pre-Ch'in Legalists is basically different from what we mean by war preparedness today in terms of class essence, some of the experiences they summed up from the practice of struggle by the newly emerging landlord class to seize and consolidate political power are of general significance as they are filled with simple materialism and dialectics. When we use the Marxist stand, viewpoint and method to analyze and study them, getting rid of their dregs and retaining their essence, a great deal of historical experience can be useful to us in strengthening war preparations by the proletariat.

"War does not come into conflict with the foundations of private property, but is the direct and inevitable development of these foundations." (Lenin, "The United States of Europe Slogan") As long as classes still exist and the social systems giving rise to war still exist, war will break out. We must step up our war preparations under the guidance of a correct line. So far as this is concerned, what was true for the Spring and Autumn and Warring States

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* "Having Standards, Han Fei Tzu."

** "Outer Discussion on the Left Part I, Han Fei Tzu."

periods when the feudal system replaced the slave system is even more true for the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution when all exploiting classes are to be wiped out and all systems of exploitation are to be buried. At present, the international situation is characterized by great chaos under heaven, the various contradictions in the world are further intensified, and factors of both revolution and war are growing. The two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are frenziedly carrying out an arms race, trying by all possible means to suppress the revolutionary movements of the people and seize world hegemony. Soviet revisionist social-imperialism, in particular, is even more ferocious and hideous. The contention between the two hegemonic lords, the Soviet Union and the United States, will one day lead to a world war. Chairman Mao has pointed out: "The danger of a new world war still exists, and the people of various countries must get prepared." (Jen-min Jih-pao, May 21, 1970) We never believe in anything like "permanent peace" and "a generation of peace." We must preserve a high degree of vigilance against an aggressive war that may be unleashed by imperialism and particularly against a surprise attack by Soviet revisionist social-imperialism against our country. The renegade and traitor Lin Piao, to achieve his criminal purpose of subverting the dictatorship of the proletariat and restoring capitalism, vigorously peddled the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, pushed a counterrevolutionary revisionist line, and opposed Chairman Mao's great thinking on people's war. He went out of his way to trumpet the "theory that war preparations are useless," to sabotage the building of our army and militia, to disrupt scientific research for national defense and production of the military industry, and to seriously impair the war preparation work of our army. These crimes perpetrated by Lin Piao in undermining war preparation work must be thoroughly criticized and their pernicious influence eradicated.

The great leader Chairman Mao has taught us: "The whole Party must pay attention to war, study military affairs, and prepare to fight." ("War and Problems of Strategy") We must seriously study well the theory of proletarian dictatorship, promote stability and unity, develop the national economy, grasp time and make adequate preparations, both mentally and physically, against a war of aggression. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, we must build an iron wall of people's war to protect our socialist mother country of proletarian dictatorship and be ready at all times to wipe out all invading enemies resolutely, lock, stock and barrel.

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